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THE CITIZENSHIP LINE: RETHINKING 
IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM 
Rachel E. Rosenbloom* 
Abstract: It is not possible to police the movement of “aliens” without 
first determining who is and is not a citizen. Yet little scholarly attention 
has been devoted to the nature of citizenship determinations or their im-
plication for our understanding of immigration enforcement as a whole. 
Thousands of U.S. citizens are caught up in immigration enforcement ac-
tions every year, and dozens of cases have come to light in which errone-
ous deportations can be traced to the lack of procedural protections with-
in the deportation system, manifested in summary proceedings, lengthy 
detention, and lack of access to counsel. Such cases compel us to recon-
ceptualize citizenship as not just a status that precedes immigration en-
forcement but also one that is, in a functional sense, produced by such 
enforcement. This insight has important consequences for both theoreti-
cal understandings of citizenship and constitutional analysis of immigra-
tion enforcement. Drawing on historical and contemporary material, this 
Article proposes a new understanding of “immigration exceptionalism,” 
exploring its implications for the rights of both citizens and noncitizens 
and highlighting its central reliance on the notion that citizenship status 
can function as a threshold jurisdictional inquiry. Arguing that such reli-
ance is misplaced, this Article proposes a wholesale reconsideration of 
immigration enforcement’s procedural norms. 
Introduction 
 As immigration enforcement continues its stunning expansion in 
the United States, individuals across a range of statuses—documented 
and undocumented, citizen and noncitizen—are increasingly feeling its 
                                                                                                                      
© 2013, Rachel E. Rosenbloom. All rights reserved. 
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. I am grateful to Linda 
Bosniak and Hiroshi Motomura for their guidance at numerous stages of the writing of 
this Article; to Kerry Abrams, Libby Adler, Martha Davis, Daniel Kanstroom, Jennifer Lee 
Koh, Stephen Lee, Jacqueline Stevens, and the participants in the 2012 Immigration Law 
Teacher’s Workshop and the Northeastern University School of Law Faculty Colloquium 
for their comments on earlier drafts; to Jaime Diez and Lisa Brodyaga for sharing their 
insights regarding the litigation of citizenship claims; and to Jessica Brokaw, Gavi Bogin-
Farber, Giovanni DiMaggio, Rebekkah Provine, Anielka Sanchez Godinez, Isela Ramos, 
and Becky Schapiro for excellent research assistance. 
1965 
1966 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1965 
effects.1 The substantive provisions of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”) apply only to “aliens,” defined as those who are “not . . . 
citizen[s] or national[s] of the United States.”2 It is impossible, how-
ever, to police the movement of noncitizens without first determining 
who is and is not a citizen. Scholars and advocates have long argued 
that immigration enforcement has widespread effects on U.S. citizens 
who are racially profiled as foreign.3 Yet scholarship is only just begin-
ning to consider the nature of citizenship determinations and their 
implication for our understanding of immigration enforcement as a 
whole.4 
 This Article argues that acknowledging the presence of U.S. citi-
zens within the immigration enforcement system calls into question 
                                                                                                                      
1 Since 2003, immigration enforcement has fallen primarily to two agencies within the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”): Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”), which enforces immigration laws in the interior; and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”), which enforces immigration laws at U.S. borders and ports of entry. 6 
U.S.C. §§ 252, 271, 291 (2012). Historically, a variety of agencies and departments have 
enforced immigration laws, including the Department of the Treasury and the now-
disbanded Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2012); Act of 
Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390 (repealed 1943); U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services, Overview of INS History 4–5 (2012), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ 
USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf. 
As this Article discusses immigration enforcement efforts dating from the late nineteenth 
century, it employs the term “immigration enforcement” to refer to the enforcement ac-
tions of whichever governmental agency has been tasked with enforcing immigration laws 
at the relevant time at issue. 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012). The INA governs the admission and deportation of 
noncitizens as well as many aspects of citizenship itself. For a critique of the use of the 
term “alien” in legal and political discourse, see Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. 
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. 
Rev. 263, 273 (1997) (arguing that “[t]he term alien serves as a device that intellectually 
legitimizes the mistreatment of noncitizens and helps to mask human suffering”). 
3 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 
Wash. U. L.Q. 675, 677–78 (2000); Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining 
and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 606, 654 (2011) (describing 
“[w]idespread, unlawful and ethnic profiling at the borders, in workplaces, and in pris-
ons”). 
4 See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability in Immigration Law, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2013) (discussing citizenship claims as one example of "complex re-
movability"); Stevens, supra note 3 (presenting empirical research on the detention and 
deportation of U.S. citizens); Lee J. Terán, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and 
Other Tales of Challenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583 (2012) (de-
scribing challenges faced by Mexicans who claim U.S. citizenship on the basis of their 
births to U.S. citizen parents); Laura Donohue, Note, The Potential for a Rise in Wrongful 
Removals and Detention Under the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Secure 
Communities Strategy, 38 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 125 (2012) (arguing 
that immigration enforcement strategies after September 11, 2001 caused the detention 
and deportation of many U.S. citizens). 
2013] The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism 1967 
some basic tenets of the U.S. Supreme Court’s immigration jurispru-
dence. A person who claims, but has not yet established, citizenship 
stands on the divide not only between two divergent outcomes (the 
right to remain versus the potential to be deported), but also between 
two different conceptions of procedural justice. Case law, statutes, and 
regulations grant more robust due process protections to citizenship 
claims than to other claims that arise within the removal process.5 This 
distinction exemplifies a larger divide that relegates noncitizens to a 
constitutional netherworld with regard to immigration enforcement 
procedures. Yet a closer look at the experiences of U.S. citizens within 
this system, both past and present, reveals the elusiveness of a clear 
boundary between noncitizens and citizens. The relaxed procedural 
norms of immigration law have shown a tendency to migrate into the 
treatment of citizenship determinations.6 So have the racial fault lines 
of immigration law: known cases in which U.S. citizens have been de-
tained and deported tend to reflect the immigration enforcement pri-
orities of the day, with the majority of early cases involving Chinese 
Americans and the majority of contemporary cases involving Latinos, 
particularly Mexican Americans.7 
 Although most citizenship claims are easily documented, there 
remain many U.S. citizens who have a tenuous evidentiary hold on 
their status.8 Citizenship determinations occur in many forms, from an 
officer’s snap judgment about whom to question to prolonged litiga-
tion before agency adjudicators and courts. In some contexts, such as 
passport control at an airport, a citizenship determination may be rou-
tine and unremarkable. Yet a person taken into custody in a workplace 
raid or upon release from the county jail may have no ready means of 
proving citizenship. There are many examples—stretching from the 
late nineteenth century to the present day—of cases in which U.S. citi-
zens have had to wage protracted battles to prove their citizenship, or 
have been deported prior to being able to do so. The case law is filled 
                                                                                                                      
5 See infra notes 210–235 and accompanying text. Before 1996, noncitizens appre-
hended at the border were placed in “exclusion” proceedings, and those apprehended in 
the interior were placed in “deportation” proceedings. In 1996, Congress consolidated 
these two types of proceedings under the new term “removal.” See Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 
3009-546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229). This Article uses the term “removal 
proceedings” when discussing post-1996 proceedings. It also uses the term “deportation” 
in its colloquial sense to refer collectively to orders of deportation, exclusion, and removal. 
6 See infra notes 236–255 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 303–314 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 31–115 and accompanying text. 
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with unrecorded births and birth certificates whose authenticity is ques-
tioned.9 Citizenship claims based on descent often require would-be 
citizens to prove not only their parents’ or grandparents’ places of 
birth, but also that the relatives spent the requisite amount of time in 
the United States to convey citizenship to a child.10 In some cases, valid 
documentation of citizenship is readily available but never enters the 
official record due to the summary nature of immigration proceedings, 
the inherently coercive effects of detention, and the lack of legal repre-
sentation for detainees.11 
 Incidents in which U.S. citizens have been subject to deportation 
or prolonged detention are often characterized as mistakes or out-
liers.12 I argue that rather than relegating such incidents to the mar-
gins, we should recognize the extent to which they are woven into the 
fabric of immigration enforcement. At the dawn of federal immigration 
restriction in the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court set 
immigration law apart from other areas of constitutional doctrine by 
deeming Congress’s power to be “plenary” with regard to both the ad-
mission and deportation of foreign nationals.13 The plenary power doc-
trine has diminished in scope over the decades, but immigration law 
has continued to stand apart in both its procedural and substantive as-
pects.14 Although this “immigration exceptionalism” has drawn exten-
sive attention from immigration law scholars, commentary tends to fo-
cus primarily on its implications for the rights of noncitizens.15 Here, I 
                                                                                                                      
 
9 Terán, supra note 4, at 603–06; Rachel E. Rosenbloom, In the Borderlands of Citizen-
ship: Birth Registration Along the U.S.-Mexico Divide 15 (Sept. 25, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
10 See 7 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 93.02[5][c]–
[d] (rev. ed. 2012). 
11 See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (describing an immigration detainee 
who was unable to gather documentation of citizenship because of his detention). 
12 See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter ICE Hearing] (statement of Rep. Steve 
King, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Interna-
tional Law) (noting the safeguards in place to prevent the deportation of U.S. citizens and 
stating that “[t]o deal with all of [immigration enforcement] without a single mistake 
would be asking too much of a mortal”); Paloma Esquivel, Suit Filed over Man’s Deportation 
Ordeal, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 2008, at B4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/ 
28/local/me-guzman28 (quoting an ICE official describing Guzman’s case as “one-of-a-
kind”). 
13 See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 133–152 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra note 129 and accompanying text (citing scholarship that discusses the im-
plications of immigration exceptionalism for noncitizens). Although this literature has 
generally not considered the direct effects of plenary power on U.S. citizens, some of it has 
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set forth a broader understanding of immigration exceptionalism, 
highlighting its implications for the rights of both citizens and nonciti-
zens. This more expansive version of immigration exceptionalism, 
which I call the “citizenship line,” stands on three principles: first, that 
the government has heightened powers with regard to the admission or 
deportation of noncitizens; second, that U.S. citizens are exempt from 
the exercise of such powers and therefore must be accorded not only 
greater substantive rights but also enhanced procedural protections; 
and third, that citizenship therefore must be treated as a threshold ju-
risdictional question. 
 The citizenship line, which is embodied in case law, statutes, regu-
lations, and agency policies, reflects an understanding of citizenship 
that is generally echoed in scholarship as well—that the population of 
the world is easily divided into two groups: those who are U.S. citizens 
and those who are not.16 In practice, though, it is fairly easy to misclas-
sify a U.S. citizen as a noncitizen. Such misclassifications often stem 
from the relaxed procedural safeguards embodied in the immigration 
enforcement system, including lack of counsel, the prospect of pro-
longed detention, and summary proceedings.17 This phenomenon 
suggests the need to understand citizenship not just as a status that pre-
cedes immigration enforcement but as one that can be produced, at 
least in a functional sense, by such enforcement. 
 Courts and agency officials in the early days of immigration en-
forcement widely acknowledged this understanding of citizenship as a 
potentially unstable status, shaped not only by relevant doctrine but by 
the procedures used to determine it. They also openly acknowledged 
the role of race in resolving cases where the evidentiary record was un-
clear.18 In the present era, however, with the proliferation of documen-
tary evidence of citizenship, the end of formal racial classifications in 
the immigration laws, and the development of a set of ostensible safe-
guards for citizenship claims, this aspect of citizenship is rarely, if ever, 
acknowledged.19 I argue that recent deportations of U.S. citizens reveal 
                                                                                                                      
insightfully explored plenary power’s collateral effects on citizens. See, e.g., Hiroshi Moto-
mura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 1361, 1390–91 (1999); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We the People After Septem-
ber 11, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 413, 422 (2003). 
16 See infra notes 282–294 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 239–255 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 295–300 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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its continuing relevance, and the enduring fragility of the citizen-alien 
distinction that forms the bedrock of immigration law. 
 There are many vantage points from which one might launch a 
critique of immigration enforcement in general and of the U.S. immi-
gration enforcement system in particular. Some have compellingly 
questioned the wisdom or legitimacy of imposing restrictions at the 
border.20 Many have questioned the substantive norm—so central to 
U.S. immigration jurisprudence, but out of step with international hu-
man rights norms21—that even long-term residents with significant ties 
to the United States have no fundamental right to be territorially pre-
sent beyond the protections of international refugee law or the meager 
forms of relief provided by federal statute.22 In contrast to these sub-
stantive criticisms of immigration exceptionalism, this Article focuses 
on exceptionalism’s procedural aspects. It offers an argument that, 
while perhaps more modest in scope than these substantive critiques, is 
entirely new: that this system reveals itself to be premised on a distinc-
tion between citizens and noncitizens that has not proven strong 
enough to bear the weight that the courts have placed on it. 
 Part I of this Article provides four recent examples of U.S. citizens 
who have been erroneously deported or denied entry to the United 
States.23 Part II briefly reviews plenary power and immigration excep-
tionalism and then introduces a new and more expansive understand-
ing of exceptionalism as a system that has implications for both citizens 
and noncitizens.24 Part III traces the development of the citizenship line 
from the late nineteenth century to the present and describes its failure 
                                                                                                                      
20 See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, States Without Nations: Citizenship for Morals 
81–85 (2010). See generally Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 
Rev. Pol., Spring 1987, at 251 (arguing that three major contemporary approaches to 
political theory justify open borders); Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 
193 (2003) (describing moral, economic, and other policy justifications for opening bor-
ders). 
21 See Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 
Emory L.J. 1243, 1251–60 (2013); see also Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 600 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (contrasting U.S. deportation doctrine with customary international law), 
rev’d and remanded, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231–35 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (same), abrogated by Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2004). See 
generally Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 Ga. St. U. 
L. Rev. 489 (2011) (contrasting American and European approaches to deportation). 
22 See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay 7–8 (2010); Hiro-
shi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizen-
ship in the United States 190–200 (2006); Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion and the Deportation of Oscar Martinez, 15 Scholar 437, 530–32 (2013). 
23 See infra notes 31–115 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 116–162 and accompanying text. 
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to achieve the goal of protecting U.S. citizens from immigration en-
forcement.25 In Part IV, I present four interrelated arguments regarding 
this failure and what it tells us about immigration enforcement and 
about the nature of citizenship.26 I first argue that citizenship claims 
that arise within the immigration adjudication system are not ordinary 
jurisdictional disputes but rather reveal a deep contradiction at the core 
of the Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence.27 I then argue that 
this insight should lead to a new understanding of the relationship be-
tween citizenship as a legal status and citizenship in the broader sense of 
full membership in society, an understanding that takes into account the 
important and underexplored role that the procedural norms of immi-
gration enforcement play in shaping the functional boundaries of citi-
zenship.28  Next, I argue that the role of race in the adjudication of citi-
zenship claims may not be as obvious as it was a century ago, but 
nevertheless remains significant.29  Finally, I argue that deportations of 
U.S. citizens signal the existence of much broader problems within the 
immigration enforcement system, and that an effective solution cannot 
focus solely on citizenship claims but rather requires a wholesale re-
thinking of the system’s procedural norms.30 
I. The Fragility of Citizenship 
 On April 9, 1970, a headline in the Los Angeles Times proclaimed, 
“Native American Deported to Mexico in ‘Tragic’ U.S. Error.”31 The 
article described the case of Fernando Ontiverof, “[a] mentally re-
tarded Mexican-American youth—a native of Santa Barbara—[who] 
was reunited with his family in Van Nuys Wednesday after having been 
deported to Mexico in what immigration officials termed a ‘tragic er-
ror.’”32 Ontiverof was reportedly taking legally prescribed tranquilizers 
that affected his ability to communicate.33 Michael Fargione, then-
Deputy Regional Commissioner for the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (“INS”), explained that “the youth kept mentioning his 
                                                                                                                      
25 See infra notes 163–255 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 256–326 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 260–266 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 268–294 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 295–314 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 315–326 and accompanying text. 
31 Ken Lubas, Native American Deported to Mexico in ‘Tragic’ U.S. Error, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 
1970, at 1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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sister’s home as his home. We had no way of knowing he was born in 
Santa Barbara.”34 After the INS transported Ontiverof to Tijuana and 
left him there, a family friend eventually found him begging for food 
near Mexico City and helped return him to his parents.35 
 Under both Supreme Court precedent and statutory law, only 
those who lack U.S. nationality or citizenship are subject to the statutory 
requirements governing admission and deportation.36 Nevertheless, 
since the earliest days of federal immigration restriction, U.S. citizens 
have frequently come into contact with immigration enforcement.37 
Moreover, the exponential expansion of immigration enforcement over 
the past few decades has increased the potential for individuals with a 
variety of statuses—from undocumented immigrants to those in lawful 
immigrant or non-immigrant status to those who are U.S. citizens—to 
interact with such enforcement in one form or another.38 A hallmark of 
the new immigration enforcement system is its increasing integration 
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). For a 
discussion of the distinction between citizens and nationals, see 8 U.S.C. § 1408; Stephen 
H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 6 
(5th ed. 2009). 
37 See infra notes 169–209 and accompanying text. 
38 Annual deportations have increased more than twentyfold in the past thirty years, 
from 17,379 in 1981 to 391,953 in 2011. Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2011, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-3 
(follow “Table 39” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). Prosecution of immigration-
related crimes, such as illegal entry or reentry, has increased tenfold since 1980. Susan R. 
Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 Emory 
L.J. 1, 21 (2012). Another way to gauge the scope of the expansion of immigration en-
forcement is through federal appropriations. From 2004 to 2013, federal spending on 
interior immigration enforcement increased from $960 million to nearly $2.7 billion. 
Marc R. Rosenblum & William A. Kandel, Cong. Research Serv., R42057, Interior 
Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens 24 (2012). This 
expansion has been particularly evident in funding for programs for the removal of non-
citizens arrested or convicted of criminal offenses, which increased thirtyfold between 
2004 and 2011—from $23 million to $690 million—before dropping slightly to $608 mil-
lion by 2013. Id. The federal government now spends more on the various immigration 
enforcement agencies than on all other federal criminal law enforcement agencies com-
bined. See Doris Meissner et al., Migration Policy Inst., Immigration Enforcement 
in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery 11 ( Jan. 2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf (analyzing the 2013 fiscal 
year, in which the U.S. government spent $18 billion on immigration enforcement com-
pared to the combined $14.4 billion it spent on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, the U.S. Marshals Service, and the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). For an analysis of the growth of the deportation sys-
tem, see Daniel Kanstroom, Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American 
Diaspora 3–18 (2012). 
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with the criminal justice system.39 Individuals who have any contact with 
law enforcement and are suspected of being foreign nationals are at risk 
of being funneled into the detention and removal process.40 
 Statistics on the number of U.S. citizens detained or deported are 
elusive, but a few recent studies suggest some starting points. One study 
of the files of 8,027 detainees held in a pair of immigration detention 
facilities in Arizona between 2006 and 2008 found that 1% of those in 
detention were ultimately determined by immigration judges to be U.S. 
citizens,41 whether by acquired citizenship,42 derived citizenship,43 or 
citizenship by birth in the United States.44 Additionally, a 2009 report by 
an affiliate of the New York City Bar Association revealed that 8% of de-
tainees surveyed at a New York City immigration detention center had 
derivative citizenship claims that appeared to be valid.45 A survey of im-
migration attorneys in Minnesota found that 38% of attorneys who had 
represented detained clients between 2007 and 2009 reported having 
represented at least one detained U.S. citizen.46 Finally, a 2011 report by 
the Warren Institute at the University of California at Berkeley found 
that 1.6% of those apprehended by Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (“ICE”) through its Secure Communities program were U.S. 
citizens.47 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 471–73 (2007) (describing the emerg-
ing literature on the convergence of immigration law and criminal law); Juliette Stumpf, 
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 376 
(2006) (coining the term “crimmigration”). 
40 See Legomsky, supra note 39, at 472, 482–86 (describing the vast array of criminal 
convictions that may result in deportation); Stumpf, supra note 39, at 383–84 (same). 
41 Stevens, supra note 3, at 622. 
42 “Acquired citizenship” refers to citizenship automatically conveyed at birth from a 
U.S. citizen parent to a child born abroad. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(c)–(e), 1401(g)–(h), 
1401a, 1409 (2012). 
43 “Derivative citizenship” refers to citizenship automatically derived by a child under 
the age of eighteen, under specified circumstances, upon the naturalization of a parent. 
See id. § 1431. 
44 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants citizenship to all those 
“born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
45 City Bar Justice Ctr., NYC Know Your Rights Project 12 (2009), http://www2. 
nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/pdf/NYC_KnowYourRightsNov09.pdf. 
46 Jacob Chin et al., Attorneys’ Perspectives on the Violation of the Civil Rights of Immigrants 
Detained in Minnesota, CURA Rep., Spring/Summer 2010, at 16, 18. 
47 Aarti Kohli et al., The Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Law & Soc. Policy, 
Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due Process 
4 (2011), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. 
Secure Communities is a DHS program that facilitates the sharing of data between ICE and 
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 Cases similar to Ontiverof’s have been documented with increas-
ing frequency over the past few years.48 Drawing on cases reported in 
scholarly articles, media reports, and the private files of attorneys, this 
Part provides four examples, involving five individuals, that illustrate 
the ways in which immigration enforcement impacts U.S. citizens. Sec-
tion A discusses Peter Guzman, who accepted “voluntary” departure 
after being induced to sign a document that he could not understand 
stating he was not a citizen.49 Section B discusses “Antonio,” who was 
deported after being unable to gather evidence of his citizenship dur-
ing his ten months in immigration detention.50 Section C discusses 
Laura Nancy Castro and Yuliana Castro, who were denied entry into 
the United States after their mother was coerced into falsely admitting 
that their birth certificates were fraudulent.51 Finally, Section D de-
scribes Mark Lyttle, who was deported after an immigration court hear-
ing in which he gave up his citizenship claim out of fear that he would 
be subject to lengthy detention if he fought his case.52 
A. Peter Guzman 
 Peter Guzman (sometimes referred to as Pedro Guzman), who was 
born and raised in Southern California, accepted “voluntary”53 depar-
ture after signing documents he did not understand.54 Guzman came 
into contact with immigration enforcement in 2007 while in criminal 
                                                                                                                      
state and local law enforcement agencies. See Secure Communities, U.S Immigr. & Customs 
Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
48 See Stevens, supra note 3, at 620 (referring to thirty-two cases of U.S. citizens who 
were deported since 2003); Terán, supra note 4, at 651–54 (describing several cases in de-
tail and referring to dozens of illegal reentry cases handled by federal defender offices in 
Texas that resulted in findings of U.S. citizenship). 
49 See infra notes 54–66 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 67–85 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 86–100 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. 
53 Voluntary departure is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006). It functions as an al-
ternative to an order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving 
Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 
N.C. L. Rev. 475, 486–491 (2012) (describing removal proceedings and the voluntary de-
parture process). 
54 See, e.g., ICE Hearing, supra note 12, at 33 (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark 
D. Rosenbaum); Esquivel, supra note 12; Daniel Hernandez, Pedro Guzman’s Return, LA WKLY., 
Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.laweekly.com/2007-08-09/news/pedro-guzman-s-return/; Jacque-
line Stevens, Thin ICE, Nation, June 23, 2008, at 21, 21–22, available at http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/thin-ice#. 
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custody on a minor vandalism charge.55 He declared himself a U.S. citi-
zen at his booking.56 Nonetheless, ICE officials later interviewed him 
regarding his status pursuant to an agreement between the Los Angeles 
County Board of Supervisors and the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity under the 287(g) Program, through which local law enforcement 
personnel may perform immigration enforcement functions otherwise 
left to the federal government.57 Guzman attended special education 
classes as a child and reportedly has difficulty reading and writing.58 He 
cannot remember his home phone number.59 He has complained of 
hearing voices and was prescribed antipsychotic medication one week 
after his arrest.60 At the interview regarding his citizenship status, at 
which no attorney was present, Guzman signed a document written in 
Spanish that he could not understand.61 The document stated that he 
was a Mexican citizen with no legal status in the United States, and that 
he agreed to voluntarily depart to Mexico.62 On the basis of this state-
ment, ICE transported Guzman by bus to Tijuana and left him there.63 
 Despite a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union, wide-
spread media attention, and sustained search efforts by his family 
members, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) repeatedly turned 
Guzman away at border crossing points.64 Guzman wandered in Mexico 
for three months, eating out of garbage cans.65 He was eventually able 
                                                                                                                      
55 ICE Hearing, supra note 12, at 33 (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Ros-
enbaum). Guzman was originally arrested for trespass, but later pleaded guilty to vandal-
ism before coming into contact with immigration enforcement. Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 32; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) (authorizing DHS to enter into agree-
ments with state and local governments to promote cooperation on immigration enforce-
ment matters); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Memorandum 
of Understanding 1 ( Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ memo-
randumsofAgreementUnderstanding/losangeles_county_board_of_supervisors.pdf (author-
izing cooperation between the DHS and Los Angeles jail authorities on immigration en-
forcement matters). 
58 ICE Hearing, supra note 12, at 32 (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Ros-
enbaum). 
59 Id. (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Rosenbaum). 
60 Id. at 33 (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Rosenbaum). 
61 Second Amended Complaint at 11, Guzman v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-03127-
GHK-SS (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010). 
62 ICE Hearing, supra note 12, at 33 (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Ros-
enbaum). 
63 Id. (statement of James J. Brosnahan and Mark D. Rosenbaum). 
64 Esquivel, supra note 12. 
65 Id. 
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to return to the United States only because CBP took him into custody 
at the border after his name showed up on a database indicating that 
there was a criminal warrant out for his arrest due to his failure to ap-
pear at a probation hearing.66 
B. “Antonio” 
 “Antonio”67 was born in Mexico in 1954.68 His mother, a U.S. citi-
zen, was born in Texas in 1922 and lived in the United States for her 
entire life, first in Texas and later in California.69 In the early 1950s, 
while living in Brownsville, Texas, she was involved for several years with 
a Mexican man who lived just across the border in Matamoros, Mex-
ico.70 The couple had two children, Antonio and his brother, both of 
whom were born in Matamoros.71 The children lived with their mother 
in Brownsville during their early years.72 By the time Antonio was four, 
however, he and his brother went to live with a family friend in Mata-
moros who raised them for about five years, at which point they began 
living with their father.73 Antonio visited his mother periodically after 
that and in 1977 he applied for a certificate of citizenship.74 Although 
the application that he submitted was marked as recommended for ap-
proval, his case was later closed because he failed to submit additional 
requested evidence.75 In 1986, his mother died.76 
                                                                                                                      
66 Hernandez, supra note 54. Guzman’s suit for constitutional violations eventually set-
tled. See Guzman v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-03127-GHK-SS (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2010) 
(court order granting settlement). 
67 The name of this individual has been changed to protect his privacy, and identifying 
information has been removed from all citations relating to his case. Many thanks to At-
torney Jaime Diez for providing information about this case. 
68 Antonio’s Application for Certificate of Citizenship and supporting documents 
(Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with author). 
69 Id. These facts are sufficient to make Antonio a U.S. citizen from birth by action of 
law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012) (granting citizenship to an out-of-wedlock child born 
abroad to a U.S. citizen mother where the mother has been present in the United States 
for one year prior to the child’s birth); Gordon et al., supra note 1010, § 93.02[5][c]–
[d]. 
70 Antonio’s Application for Certificate of Citizenship, supra note 68 (affidavits of An-






76 Antonio’s Application for Certificate of Citizenship, supra note 68. 
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 Antonio was placed in removal proceedings in 2001 and was held 
in immigration detention for ten months.77 He explained to the immi-
gration judge that he could not gather proof to support his citizenship 
claim while detained.78 Unable to persuade the judge to release him 
and unable to afford an attorney, he finally gave up fighting his case 
and was removed to Mexico.79 Following his removal, he applied for a 
passport at a U.S. consulate in Mexico, but was again unable to gather 
the necessary proof to support his claim.80 
 Having determined that he would not be able to establish citizen-
ship from outside of the country, Antonio reentered the U.S. without 
inspection, at which point he was apprehended and charged with the 
federal crime of illegal reentry following removal.81 Now the subject of 
a criminal charge, he was entitled to a court-appointed attorney. Be-
cause U.S. citizenship is a defense to an illegal reentry claim,82 the 
court-appointed attorney obtained the assistance of an immigration 
attorney in filing a new application for a certificate of citizenship.83 Af-
ter six months, the government dismissed the illegal reentry charge 
based on the apparent strength of Antonio’s citizenship claim and re-
leased him from criminal custody.84 He was nevertheless held in immi-
gration detention for six more months, until his application for a cer-
tificate of citizenship was finally granted.85 
C. Yuliana and Laura Nancy Castro 
 Yuliana and Laura Nancy Castro were born in Texas, in 1980 and 
1984 respectively, to parents who were Mexican citizens residing in 
Mexico.86 Both grew up in Mexico and eventually settled in Texas and 
                                                                                                                      
 




81 Indictment (Oct. 8, 2002) (on file with author); see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
82 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012) (providing for the collateral attack on the validity of 
an underlying removal order within a criminal proceeding on illegal reentry charge, un-
der specified circumstances); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–39 
(1987) (holding that an illegal reentry conviction under the prior version of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326 would violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process if based on a 
deportation proceeding that lacked fundamental fairness). 
83 Email from Jaime Diez, supra note 77. 
84 Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Apr. 9, 2003) (on file with author). 
85 Email from Jaime Diez, supra note 77. 
86 Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 12, Castro v. Freeman, No. 1:09-cv-
00208 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Castro Complaint]. Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Castro sisters are American citizens by virtue of their births in the United 
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began raising families there.87 In August 2009, after visiting family in 
Mexico, they attempted to return from Matamoros, Mexico to Browns-
ville, Texas with their mother, Trinidad Muraira de Castro.88 Under the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (“WHTI”), which went into effect 
in June 2009, U.S. citizens must have a passport to enter the United 
States at a land border crossing.89 CBP, however, had a publicized policy 
of permitting applicants for admission to show a birth certificate and a 
receipt for the passport application instead of a passport.90 Crossing the 
border soon after the WHTI had gone into effect, Laura Nancy pre-
sented a U.S. passport, and Yuliana presented her Texas birth certifi-
cate and passport application receipt.91 Their mother presented a visi-
tor visa.92 
 CBP officers subjected the three women to extensive questioning 
regarding the veracity of Yuliana and Laura Nancy’s citizenship 
claims.93 Officials took the three women into separate rooms and held 
them for over ten hours, during which time officials “interrogated, 
mocked, harassed, and threatened [them] with deportation or impris-
onment” and repeatedly asked them to sign confessions that the birth 
certificates were fraudulent.94 CBP denied them food and water and 
refused requests to call for help or speak to relatives who had come to 
the border crossing to look for them.95 Yuliana Castro, who was recov-
ering from childbirth and travelling with her newborn baby, later de-
scribed hearing her baby cry uncontrollably outside the examination 
                                                                                                                      
States. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. Many thanks to attorneys Jaime Diez and Lisa 
Brodayaga for providing information about this case. 
87 Castro Complaint, supra note 86, at 12; Jazmine Ulloa, Born to Be Barred, Tex. Ob-
server, May 2010, at 7, 7, available at http://www.texasobserver.org/cover-story/born-to-
be-barred. 
88 Castro Complaint, supra note 86, at 13; Ulloa, supra note 87, at 7; Jazmine Ulloa, Record: 
Mother, Daughters Detained Because Birth Certificate from Midwife, Brownsville Herald, Jan. 2, 
2010, http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/midwife-106964-brownsville-daughters. 
html. 
89 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
§ 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823–24, amended by Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 546, 120 Stat. 1355, 
1386–87 (2006), and Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 723, 121 Stat. 266, 349–50 (2007) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012)); see 22 C.F.R. § 53.1 (2013). 
90 Castro Complaint, supra note 86, at 11. 
91 Ulloa, supra note 87, at 7. 
92 Id. 
93 Castro v. Freeman, No. 1:11-cv-00087 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2011); Ulloa, supra note 87, 
at 8. 
94 Ulloa, supra note 87, at 8; accord Castro, No. 1:11-cv-00087, at 3. 
95 Castro Complaint, supra note 86, at 13; Ulloa, supra note 87. 
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room during her interrogation.96 According to her description, “the 
officer continued harassing me, yelling at me, and telling me that I was 
Mexican and that he was going to deport me. . . . After a while, I real-
ized I had no way out since he told me no matter what I did, to him I 
was Mexican.”97 After approximately ten hours, Trinidad Muraira de 
Castro signed a statement saying that her daughters’ birth certificates 
were fraudulent and that they were not U.S. citizens.98 Immigration 
officials then confiscated the women’s documents, recorded the appli-
cations for entry as withdrawn, and forced them to return to Mexico.99 
The Department of State later recognized the validity of the Castros’ 
citizenship claims, after they filed suit for a declaratory judgment in 
federal court.100 
D. Mark Lyttle 
 Mark Lyttle was born in North Carolina and lived his entire life in 
the United States before being deported to Mexico in 2008.101 Lyttle, 
who has a history of mental illness and cognitive impairment, came in-
to contact with ICE following a misdemeanor assault charge stemming 
from an incident that occurred while he was a patient at a psychiatric 
hospital.102 After interviewing Lyttle in the prison mental health ward 
in which he was being held, an ICE agent filled out a form that identi-
fied Lyttle as Jose Thomas and alleged that he had entered the United 
States from Mexico without authorization at age three.103 The agent 
insisted that Lyttle sign it without allowing him to review the contents 
                                                                                                                      
96 Ulloa, supra note 87, at 8. 
97 Id. (quoting Yuliana Castro). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Castro, No. 1:11-cv-00087, at 3. 
101 Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266 (M.D. Ga. 2012); Complaint at 1–
2, Lyttle v. United States, No. 4:10-cv-00142 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Lyttle 
Complaint]; Stevens, supra note 3, at 675–77; Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported to 
Mexico, Charlotte Observer, Aug. 30, 2009, at 1B, available at http://www.charlotte 
observer.com/2009/08/30/917007/nc-native-wrongly-deported-to.html; William Finne-
gan, The Deportation Machine, New Yorker, Apr. 29, 2013, at 24. See generally Posts with La-
bel Mark Lyttle, States Without Nations, http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/ 
search/label/Mark%20Lyttle (providing extensive coverage and commentary on Mark 
Lyttle’s cases). 
102 Lyttle Complaint, supra note 101, at 7. 
103 Id. at 9. ICE chose to interview Lyttle based on an intake form filled out by a prison 
official that erroneously listed his ethnicity as “Oriental,” his citizenship as “alien,” and his 
birthplace as Mexico. Id. at 8. 
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of the form.104 Lyttle signed the statement saying that he was Jose 
Thomas, but signed it with his own name.105 The agent later filed a re-
port stating that Lyttle’s claim to having been born in North Carolina 
was dismissed because Lyttle did “not possess any documentation to 
support his claim.”106 As the removal process continued, Lyttle contin-
ued to state that he was a U.S. citizen, but again signed forms that iden-
tified him as Jose Thomas, under similarly coercive circumstances.107 
Lyttle was ordered removed by an immigration judge at a hearing in 
which he had no counsel.108 Asked later why he did not appeal the re-
moval order, Lyttle replied, “I was going to appeal until I found out that 
it would be six months to two years [in detention] before I’d have a 
chance [to have the case heard], and even if I did that, they still 
wouldn’t believe me.”109 
 ICE subsequently deported Lyttle to Mexico.110 Eight days later, he 
made an unsuccessful attempt to reenter the United States and was re-
moved within hours.111 He was later deported from Mexico, and en-
dured a four-month odyssey in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, 
during which time he was jailed and suffered numerous health prob-
lems.112  Lyttle finally managed to get the U.S. consulate in Guatemala 
to contact his brother, who sent proof of his citizenship.113 Lyttle then 
traveled back to the United States on a temporary passport, but was 
nevertheless initially placed once again in removal proceedings upon 
his arrival.114 He was released two days later.115 
                                                                                                                      
104 Id. at 10. 
105 Id. 
106 Collins, supra note 101. 
107 Id. 
108 Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (stating that “it is reasonable to infer that the [immi-
gration judge] simply rubber-stamped the false conclusion and unsupported record con-
structed by . . . ICE Defendants that stated Lyttle was a citizen of Mexico”). 
109 Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Kidnaps Mark Lyttle, Leaves Him Stateless in Mexico, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, States Without Nations (Apr. 24, 2009, 8:35PM), http:// 
stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2009/04/us-kidnaps-mark-lyttle-leaves-him.html (quot-
ing interview with Mark Lyttle). 
110 Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 
111 Id. at 1272–73. 
112 Id. at 1273. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1272. 
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II. Citizens, Noncitizens, and Exceptionalism 
 The deportation of a U.S. citizen has no basis in law.116 The inter-
esting question, then, is not if such cases represent errors but rather 
what kind of problem they reveal. How do we make sense of cases in 
which U.S. citizens have been deported? A common response to these 
incidents is that they are, as the 1970 L.A. Times headline put it, “tragic 
. . . error[s].”117 Such a response suggests that the problem lies solely in 
the functioning of the threshold sorting mechanism that determines 
who is and who is not subject to immigration enforcement. In other 
words, these are the right procedures, but they have been directed at 
the wrong people. The remainder of this Article argues that such a re-
sponse falls short in that it assumes the existence of a clear line dividing 
citizens from noncitizens and fails to acknowledge the role of immigra-
tion procedures themselves in shaping the functional boundaries of 
citizenship. Rather than simply signaling a shortcoming in the sorting 
mechanism, such cases raise fundamental questions about immigration 
enforcement and its procedural norms. 
 To lay the groundwork for this argument, this Part considers how 
the immigration enforcement system is, doctrinally speaking, supposed 
to work. Section A provides a brief overview of plenary power and im-
migration exceptionalism as traditionally conceived.118 Section B adds a 
new dimension to this account by considering immigration exception-
alism as a system that embodies assumptions not just about the rights of 
noncitizens but about the rights of citizens and the nature of citizen-
ship as well.119 
A. Immigration Exceptionalism 
 Within immigration law, the statutory line drawn by citizenship 
status is stark. The requirements set forth by the INA, from visa criteria 
to grounds of deportability, apply solely to those who are “not . . . citi-
zen[s] or national[s] of the United States.”120 Immigration courts, 
                                                                                                                      
116 See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
117 See Lubas, supra note 31, at 1; accord ICE Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of 
Rep. Steve King, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and 
International Law) (noting the safeguards put in place to prevent deportation of U.S. citi-
zens and stating that “[t]o deal with all of [immigration enforcement] without a single 
mistake would be asking too much of a mortal”); Esquivel, supra note 12 (quoting an ICE 
official who described Guzman’s case as “one-of-a-kind”). 
118 See infra notes 120–152 and accompanying text. 
119 See infra notes 153–162 and accompanying text. 
120 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining "alien"). 
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which have the power to order the forcible removal of a noncitizen 
from the United States, have no jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.121 Im-
migration officers have no authority to detain them.122 
s.”125 
                                                                                                                     
 The relationship of citizenship status to the Constitution is more 
complex. The Bill of Rights has proved to be “a futile authority for the 
alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores,”123 but “once 
an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the 
Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, tem-
porary, or permanent.”124 Territoriality alone, however, does not re-
solve all constitutional questions. Even when considering the rights of 
those present on U.S. soil, the U.S. Supreme Court has returned on 
numerous occasions to one central axiom: “In the exercise of its broad 
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizen
 The starting point for any discussion of immigration exceptional-
ism is the plenary power doctrine. The fundamental premise of the 
plenary power doctrine, as stated in the 1892 Supreme Court case Ni-
shimura Ekiu v. United States, is that “every sovereign nation has the 
 
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012) (establishing the requirements for the initiation of re-
moval proceedings against “aliens”); Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284 (“Jurisdiction in the ex-
ecutive to order deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of 
citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”). 
122 Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement, to Field Officer Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsels 1 
(Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Guidance on Citizenship Claims], available at 
www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/usc_guidance_nov_2009.pdf (providing the 
most recent guidance in a series of memoranda, and stating that “[a]s a matter of law, ICE 
cannot assert its civil immigration enforcement authority to arrest and/or detain a [U.S. 
citizen]”); see also Andrew Becker, Observe and Deport, Mother Jones (Apr. 23, 2009, 8:35 
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/04/observe-and-deport (quoting Rep-
resentative Zoe Lofgren who stated, “There’s no jurisdiction for the government to arrest 
or detain, or let alone deport, citizens. That’s otherwise known as kidnapping . . . .”). Out-
side of the immigration context, a host of other federal statutes distinguish between citi-
zens and noncitizens in areas such as public benefits, employment, investment, and busi-
ness ownership. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 & n.12 (1976). 
123 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
124 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). The U.S. Supreme Court has long held 
that a noncitizen who is territorially present and facing removal has the right to notice and 
an opportunity to be heard. See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 
86, 101 (1903). 
125 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79–80). On 
the relationship between territoriality and constitutional rights, see generally Linda Bos-
niak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (2006); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution (1996). 
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power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to 
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit 
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.”126 Early cases paint this power to exclude as one that the 
federal government may “exercise at any time when, in the judgment of 
the government, the interests of the country require it,” without inter-
ference by the courts.127 The case law from this era also recognizes the 
government’s power to deport to be as absolute and unqualified as its 
power to exclude those arriving at the border.128 
 A number of scholars have chronicled the emergence of cracks in 
the plenary power doctrine over the decades.129 Plenary power exerts 
less influence on the procedural rights of noncitizens than on their 
substantive rights.130 It exerts less influence on the rights of those ap-
prehended in the United States than on those standing (literally or fig-
uratively) at the border.131 Finally, at the border, the doctrine exerts less 
                                                                                                                      
126 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
127 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889); accord Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. 
128 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). 
129 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Con-
stitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 55–66 (1998) [hereinafter Chin, Segrega-
tion’s Last Stronghold]; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 258 [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law]; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 
22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925, 931–37 (1995); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale 
L.J. 545, 564–80 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Proce-
dural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625, 1637–46, 1650–
56 (1992) [hereinafter Motomura, Curious Evolution]; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation 
of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 62–73 (1984); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of 
Plenary Power, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 339, 341–46 (2002); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a 
Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 257, 258 (2000) (arguing that at the 
time the foundational plenary power cases were decided, the Supreme Court could have 
reached the same result even if the cases had involved the rights of citizens under domestic 
constitutional law); Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 
Admin. L. Rev. 565, 587–90 (2012) (arguing that in the context of nonlegislative rules, 
immigration law is in step with the rest of federal administrative law). 
130 Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952) (declining to rec-
ognize any substantive right to remain in the United States for a longtime legal resident 
facing deportation), with Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 90 (recognizing the procedural right to 
notice and opportunity to be heard in deportation proceedings). 
131 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”). 
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influence on the rights of returning lawful residents than on the rights 
of new arrivals.132 
 Despite this gradual weakening of plenary power, however, immi-
gration law remains largely outside mainstream American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. This phenomenon can best be seen by looking at 
the least “exceptional” aspect of immigration law: the rights of those 
apprehended in the interior of the United States who face deportation. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to procedural due 
process under the Fifth Amendment for noncitizens who fall within this 
category.133 Yet those who find themselves in removal proceedings en-
counter a system that lacks many of the safeguards generally associated 
with adjudications that involve deprivations of liberty, separation from 
family members, and other weighty interests. Respondents in removal 
proceedings have the right to counsel but not at the government’s ex-
pense.134 They have the right to present evidence in their defense but 
without the benefit of many key protections of the criminal system, 
such as the hearsay rule, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda warn-
                                                                                                                      
132 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); see also Legomsky, Immigration Law, 
supra note 129, at 260 (arguing that these gradations may neglect important individual 
interests); David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The 
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 49 (“Though the Court often en-
forces such gradations, it has not been entirely revealing or convincing about the differ-
ences, and certainly has failed to make clear just what dividing lines count for various cate-
gorical distinctions.”). In addition, the line drawn by citizenship has never been as stark 
outside immigration law as within it. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 
237 (1896) (striking down a statute providing for imprisonment at hard labor, without trial 
by jury, for Chinese immigrants unlawfully present in the United States); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (holding that the selective application of a San Francisco 
ordinance to Chinese-owned laundries violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (striking down a Texas law 
that denied public education to undocumented children). This fault line can be character-
ized as the distinction between immigration law and alienage law. See Adam B. Cox, Immi-
gration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 341, 351–53 (2008) (critiquing the 
distinction between immigration law and alienage law). The plenary power doctrine, how-
ever, has never been reducible to this distinction. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78 (applying the 
plenary power doctrine to uphold federal restrictions on public benefits for noncitizens). 
Ingrid Eagly and Jennifer Chacon have both argued persuasively against the common as-
sumption that noncitizens are treated the same as citizens within the realm of criminal law. 
See Jennifer Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 135, 
140–47 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1337–59 
(2010). 
133 See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. 
134 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)–(B) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1), (4) (2013). 
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ings.135 Many detainees face mandatory detention without an individu-
alized determination that they are a danger or a flight risk.136 
 The pairing of limited procedural safeguards with very high stakes 
sets removal proceedings apart from other legal proceedings. Deten-
tion can last for months or years while proceedings and appeals are 
pending.137 Deportees face separation from home, family, and com-
munity and, for some, the return to a country of persecution.138 Immi-
gration Judge Dana Marks captured this distinctive combination when 
she compared the hearings of asylum applicants to “holding death 
penalty cases in traffic court.”139 Although Judge Marks was referring in 
particular to those who face potential persecution if removed from the 
United States, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the high 
                                                                                                                      
135 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). The Supreme Court catego-
rizes removal proceedings as civil rather than criminal. See id. (“Consistent with the civil 
nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial 
do not apply in a deportation hearing.”). The Court thus held in its 1984 decision in INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza that the exclusionary rule, which generally prohibits the admission of evi-
dence obtained in searches that violate the Fourth Amendment, applies to immigration 
stops only in the case of “egregious” violations. Id. at 1050–51. The Court’s groundbreak-
ing 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky—holding that criminal defendants have a constitu-
tional right to be informed of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea—has 
prompted commentary on the potential for transcending the civil versus criminal distinc-
tion that has traditionally limited the constitutional rights of noncitizens within the realm 
of immigration proceedings. See 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to 
Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half 
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1494–1509 (2011); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is 
Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299, 1339–60 (2011). See generally Peter L. Markowitz, 
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immi-
gration Removal Proceedings, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289 (2008) (critiquing, pre-Padilla, 
the designation of deportation as civil); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punish-
ment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 305 (2000) (same). 
136 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 529–31. The INA mandates detention for certain noncitizens 
while their removal proceedings are pending, including most people who are deportable 
because of criminal activity and most of those apprehended at the border. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(4)–(5). Those who are not subject to mandatory deten-
tion may seek a bond hearing before an immigration judge if the Department of Home-
land Security declines to release them. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). To be released, a de-
tainee must demonstrate that he or she “would not pose a danger to the safety of other 
persons or of property . . . [and] is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.1(c)(3). 
137 Legomsky & Rodriguez, supra note 36, at 651. 
138 See Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting). 
139 Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New Immigration Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 2010, at 
A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/09immig.html (quoting Immigra-
tion Judge Dana Marks). 
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stakes of deportation more generally.140 This disjuncture has grown as 
immigration enforcement has expanded in recent decades and has 
taken on many characteristics of the criminal justice system. The cur-
rent state of immigration enforcement has been described as represent-
ing the “worst of both worlds,” with the harsh enforcement methods of 
the criminal justice system, but few of its constitutional protections.141 
The inadequacies of the current immigration adjudication system have 
prompted criticisms by the American Bar Association, advocacy groups, 
and scholars in recent years.142 There are growing calls for both a reor-
ganization of the immigration court system143 and the provision of ap-
                                                                                                                      
140 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284 (“[Deportation] may result . . . in loss of both 
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 759 
(Field, J., dissenting) (“As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a 
country of one’s residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, 
and business there contracted.”). 
141 Legomsky, supra note 39, at 472. Stephen Legomsky has described the convergence 
of immigration law and criminal law as being asymmetric: 
Those features of the criminal justice model that can roughly be classified as 
enforcement have indeed been imported. Those that relate to adjudication—
in particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in criminal cases—
have been consciously rejected. Rather than speak of importation of the crim-
inal justice model, then, a more fitting observation would be that immigration 
law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of 
the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model 
in favor of a civil regulatory regime. 
Id. 
142 See generally Comm’n on Immigration, Am. Bar Ass’n, Reforming the Immigra-
tion System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and Profes-
sionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_com- 
plete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf (providing a critique of the immigration adjudication 
system and proposing reforms); Chi. Appleseed Fund for Justice, Assembly Line Injus-
tice: Blueprint to Reform America’s Immigration Courts (2009), available at http:// 
appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-
to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf (same); Chi. Appleseed Fund for Justice, 
Appleseed, Reimagining the Immigration Court Assembly Line (2012), available at 
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Reimagining-the-Immig 
ration-Court-Assembly-Line.pdf (critiquing the changes made in the immigration court 
system between 2009 and 2012); Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering 
Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 541 (2011) (discussing 
various factors leading to shortcomings in immigration adjudications); Jill E. Family, A 
Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 595 (2009) (analyz-
ing the government’s growing use of explicit and implicit waivers to bypass formal removal 
proceedings). 
143 See Comm’n on Immigration, supra note 142, at 2-28 to -42; Preston, supra note 139. 
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pointed counsel to some or all categories of individuals in removal pro-
ceedings.144 
 Paramount among the features that make immigration enforce-
ment unique within the American legal system are the mandatory de-
tention provision of the INA, which prevents many respondents in re-
moval proceedings from being eligible for release on bond,145 and the 
fact that courts have not recognized either detention or the threat of 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Sam Dolnick, Improving Immigrant Access to Lawyers: Advocates Gather to Discuss ‘Sub-
stantial Threat’ to Justice, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2011, at A24. See generally Comm’n on Immigra-
tion, supra note 142 (arguing that granting a right to representation would increase the 
fairness and efficiency of the immigration system); Immigration & Nationality Law 
Comm., N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Report on the Right to Counsel for Detained Individu-
als in Removal Proceedings (2009), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/citybar 
justicecenter/images/stories/pdfs/report-on-the-right-to-counsel-20071793.pdf (arguing that 
due process rights require appointment of counsel to indigent persons facing removal); Erin 
Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A Legislative Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet 
Legal Needs of Unrepresented Immigrants, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 643 (2012) (advocating for legisla-
tive reform to provide non-attorney accredited representatives to all indigent noncitizens in 
removal proceedings); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Resi-
dents, 122 Yale L.J. 2394 (2013) (arguing that lawful permanent residents facing removal 
have a due process right to appointed counsel); Shani M. King, Alone and Unrepresented: A Call 
to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors, 50 Harv. J. on Legis. 331 (2013) (argu-
ing for a right to counsel for unaccompanied minors facing immigration proceedings); Mark 
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily De-
tained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 63 (2012) (arguing for a 
constitutional right to counsel for persons subject to mandatory detention pending removal 
proceedings); Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The Right to 
Court-Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings, 16 
U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 1 (2013) (arguing for court-appointed counsel for mentally ill 
persons in immigration proceedings). 
145 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012); Dora Schriro, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Im-
migration Detention Overview and Recommendations 2 (2009), available at http:// 
www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf (stating that 66% of 
detainees on September 1, 2009 were subject to mandatory detention). On detention, see 
Amnesty Int’l, Jailed Without Justice 44–46 (2009), available at http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/research/reports/usa-jailed-without-justice?page=show (advocating for a pre-
sumption against detention and for increased judicial scrutiny of immigration detention); 
Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 Harv. 
Nat’l Sec. J. 85, 141–52 (2011) (discussing the vast reach of the immigration detention 
system); Noferi, supra note 144, at 68; Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Condi-
tions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 Hastings Const. 
L.Q. 1087, 1113–18 (1995) (describing inhumane conditions at immigration detention 
facilities); Frances M. Kreimer, Note, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Im-
migration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1512–21 (2012) (argu-
ing that the immigration detention system has evolved into a system of domestic crime 
control and thus should be subject to more stringent constitutional scrutiny). 
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deportation to trigger a constitutional right to appointed counsel.146 
Although the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to civil 
confinement in other contexts, it has declined to do so with regard to 
the detention of those in removal proceedings,147 concluding that 
“when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process 
Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to 
accomplish its goal.”148 
 Another arena in which immigration law continues to stand apart 
is in the use of racial profiling in immigration enforcement. While rec-
ognizing the continuities between racial profiling within and outside 
immigration law, scholarship on the subject has nevertheless noted the 
persistence of a jurisprudential double standard that has been far more 
                                                                                                                      
146 See Legomsky, supra note 39, at 526; Noferi, supra note 144, at 68 (“Procedurally, 
immigration removal proceedings uniquely provide for preventive pretrial detention with-
out counsel pursuant to underlying proceedings without counsel.”). 
147 Compare Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (holding that an individual 
committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity could not be held once he had 
recovered his sanity absent full civil commitment proceeding), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
365–66 (1990) (importing high procedural standards associated with criminal proceedings 
to juvenile delinquency proceedings because “civil labels and good intentions do not 
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts” (quot-
ing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967))), Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) 
(“It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of lib-
erty that requires due process protection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431–33 (1979) (holding that in order to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause, the standard of proof in civil commitment hearings must be “clear and 
convincing”), with Demore, 538 U.S. at 529–31 (allowing detention of immigration detain-
ees without individualized bond determination). In its 2011 decision in Turner v. Rogers, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require court-appointed 
counsel in a civil contempt hearing stemming from non-payment of child support, even 
though the defendant faced up to twelve months of incarceration. 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 
(2011). The Court, however, noted that the opposing party in such cases was often unrep-
resented by counsel, and suggested, in dicta, that the result might be different in a case in 
which the party seeking to collect child support was the state. See id. The Court also noted 
that its holding did not extend to unusually complex cases in which a defendant “can fairly 
be represented only by a trained advocate.” Id. at 2520 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, Turner would seem to be of little relevance in the immigration context, where courts 
have repeatedly recognized the complexity of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Baltazar-
Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]mmigration laws have been termed 
second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is often the only person 
who could thread the labyrinth.” (quoting Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th 
Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
148 Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. But see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (holding that the INA re-
quires individualized custody review for those subject to indefinite detention due to the 
inability of the United States to effect removal). 
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accepting of the practice within immigration enforcement.149 In addi-
tion to repeatedly upholding the use of race as a criteria for admis-
sion,150 the Supreme Court has shown more tolerance for race-based 
stops within the context of immigration enforcement than it has in 
other contexts,151 holding that “[t]he likelihood that any given person 
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican ap-
pearance a relevant factor” in the decision to make an immigration 
stop.152 
B. Bringing Citizenship into View 
 Immigration exceptionalism has generally been viewed as an ap-
proach to the treatment of noncitizens, based on one founding princi-
ple: that a sovereign nation has heightened power to determine the 
rights of noncitizens to enter or remain within the territory. Yet to set 
forth a standard for the treatment of noncitizens begs the question of 
how citizens should be treated. A more expansive description of immi-
gration exceptionalism would thus include a second principle: that U.S. 
citizens are not directly subject to the heightened powers wielded by 
sovereign nations in the realm of immigration enforcement.153 
                                                                                                                      
 
149 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 
UCLA L. Rev. 1543, 1550 (2011) (noting the Court’s greater acceptance of racial profiling 
within immigration enforcement and stating that such cases “import a pernicious aspect of 
immigration exceptionalism into criminal procedure”); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immi-
gration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 Geo. Im-
migr. L.J. 289, 293 (2000) (observing that “[s]alient differences exist between the lawful 
role of race in criminal and immigration law enforcement”). 
150 See Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 129, at 3–4 & nn. 4–13 (citing cases 
from United States courts of appeals that “honor an unbroken line of Supreme Court de-
cisions holding that ‘Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the United 
States’” (quoting Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 97)). 
151 See Johnson, supra note 149, at 294; Johnson, supra note 3, at 692–96. 
152 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1975); accord United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (upholding referrals to secondary inspection 
at immigration checkpoints based on Mexican appearance). Racial profiling of Arabs, 
Muslims, and South Asians has drawn particular attention in the wake of the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. See generally Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, 
and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 295 (2002); Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: 
The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1185 (2002); Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Ameri-
cans as “Terrorists,” 8 Asian L.J. 1 (2001); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1575 (2002). 
153 The application of immigration laws often impacts U.S. citizens who wish to have a 
particular noncitizen present in the United States. Although U.S. citizens have challenged 
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 This principle gives rise not only to the substantive right to remain 
in the United States but also to procedural rights. Citizenship has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as being “a most precious right,” sub-
ject to the highest possible protection under the Due Process Clause.154 
Discussing border control during the Chinese Exclusion era,155 the 
Court proclaimed in 1920 in Kwock Jan Fat v. White, “It is better that 
many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that 
one natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently 
excluded from his country.”156 This doctrine, which we might call “citi-
zenship exceptionalism,” can be seen as a carve-out within immigration 
law in which the Constitution applies with full force, an exception to 
the exception.157 Citizenship exceptionalism, which has been the sub-
                                                                                                                      
 
the application of such laws as direct violations of their own constitutional rights, the 
courts have maintained a rigid distinction between such cases and cases that allege the 
actual apprehension, detention, and removal of U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787, 794–95 (1977) (rejecting argument that effects of INA on constitutional rights of 
U.S. citizen family members necessitated a higher level of judicial scrutiny); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (rejecting a First Amendment action by U.S. citizens 
seeking to compel the Attorney General to grant a visa to Belgian Marxist Ernst Mandel to 
attend academic conferences and events in the United States). 
154 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963); accord Fedorenko v. Unit-
ed States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (referring to citizenship as a “priceless treasure” (quot-
ing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting))). 
155 The Chinese Exclusion Era spanned from 1882 to 1943. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civ-
il Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1965, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 273, 280–81 (1996). Immigration laws that initially excluded only 
the Chinese were subsequently broadened to prohibit Asian immigration more generally. 
See id. See generally Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the 
Shaping of Modern Immigration Law 69–91 (1995). 
156 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (stating 
that “the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this 
Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, 
color, or race,” and confirming that the Court’s “holding does no more than to give to this 
citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country 
unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship”). 
157 Although the Supreme Court accords special treatment to factual claims regarding 
citizenship, the Court has equivocated about whether such treatment extends to substan-
tive challenges to the statutory requirements for citizenship by descent. In the 1998 Su-
preme Court case Miller v. Albright, the Court upheld a statute distinguishing between citi-
zenship by descent passed from mothers and fathers, in part because of the deferential 
standard of review required in immigration cases. 523 U.S. 420, 434 & n.11 (1998) (plural-
ity opinion). Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent criticized the plurality’s approach on this 
issue, arguing that statutes conferring citizenship at birth should not receive a lenient 
standard of review, because they involve the rights of citizens, not aliens. Id. at 480–81 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). This debate continued in the 2001 Supreme Court case Nguyen v. 
INS, in which the majority stated in dicta that, had the Court not found that the statute in 
question survived conventional equal protection scrutiny for gender-based distinctions, it 
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ject of little commentary, manifests itself in numerous aspects of con-
temporary case law, statutes, regulations, and agency policy.158 For ex-
ample, citizenship determinations benefit from more robust judicial 
review than other factual claims that arise in removal proceedings.159 
Another example can be found within expedited removal, a fast-track 
deportation procedure that bypasses the immigration courts but does 
not apply to those who claim U.S. citizenship.160 Part III describes this 
doctrine in more detail and traces its development over the course of 
the twentieth century. 
 The addition of this second principle in turn necessitates a third. A 
system built on exceptionalism can function only if everyone subject to 
immigration enforcement can be categorized as either a citizen or 
noncitizen. Thus, the third pillar of this system is that citizenship de-
terminations function as a threshold inquiry, a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to a removal proceeding. The Supreme Court declared in the 1922 
case Ng Fung Ho v. White that “[j]urisdiction in the executive to order 
deportation exists only if the person arrested is an alien. The claim of 
citizenship is thus a denial of an essential jurisdictional fact.”161 As with 
citizenship exceptionalism, this component of the citizenship line has 
been the subject of little analysis.162 
 In sum, this system rests on not one but three interlocking princi-
ples: first, that the government may exercise power over noncitizens 
within the realm of immigration law that would be unacceptable if ap-
plied to citizens; second, that U.S. citizens must be exempt from this 
exercise of executive power; and third, that a threshold inquiry can de-
                                                                                                                      
would have had to consider whether a more lenient standard of review should apply in 
light of the deference traditionally accorded to Congress on immigration matters. 533 U.S. 
53, 72–73 (2001). In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that plenary power had 
no relevance in a citizenship case, stating that “[t]he instant case is not about the admis-
sion of aliens but instead concerns the logically prior question whether an individual is a 
citizen in the first place.” Id. at 96–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
158 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284; 8 C.F.R. 253.3(b)(5) (2013); Guidance on Cit-
izenship Claims, supra note 122, at 1. 
159 See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284; infra notes 226–227 and accompanying text. 
160 See infra notes 229–230 and accompanying text. 
161 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284; accord Frank v. Rogers, 253 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 
1958) (“Until the claim of citizenship is resolved, the propriety of the entire proceeding is 
in doubt.”). 
162 Some scholarly interest in this matter is beginning to emerge. See generally Stevens, 
supra note 3 (presenting empirical research about the frequency of immigration deten-
tions and deportations of U.S. citizens); Terán, supra note 4 (describing challenges faced 
by Mexicans who claim U.S. citizenship on the basis of their births to U.S. citizen parents). 
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termine who falls into which category. I refer to this system as the “citi-
zenship line.” 
III. The Citizenship Line in Action 
 The doctrinal framework that I refer to here as the citizenship line 
is intended to ensure that the government’s heightened powers in the 
realm of immigration are confined to the treatment of noncitizens. The 
notion that citizens can be distinguished from noncitizens through a 
threshold jurisdictional inquiry is so fundamental to contemporary 
immigration enforcement that courts rarely bother to discuss it these 
days.163 This has not always been the case, however.164 In the early days 
of federal immigration restriction, courts struggled extensively with 
how to approach the question of distinguishing citizens from nonciti-
zens.165 
 Section A of this Part recounts the treatment of citizenship claims 
in the period between the 1880s and the 1920s, when the citizenship 
line emerged as a key axis of the American legal system.166 Section B 
then traces the development of safeguards to protect U.S. citizens be-
ginning in the 1920s and continuing to the present day.167 Finally, Sec-
tion C argues that despite the development of a seemingly comprehen-
sive legal framework for insulating citizens from the government’s 
broad immigration enforcement powers, the factors that historically led 
to the misclassification of U.S. citizens are still integral to the system.168 
A. The Emergence of Citizenship as a Problem 
 Distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens has been a key 
function of immigration enforcement agencies from the earliest days of 
                                                                                                                      
163 See, e.g., Joseph v. Holder, 720 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ng Fung Ho v. 
White, 259 U.S. 279, 284 (1922), for the principle that alienage is an essential jurisdic-
tional fact, without further elaboration); Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 
2010) (same). 
164 See infra notes 193–209 and accompanying text. 
165 See infra notes 193–209 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 169–209 and accompanying text. A different sort of citizenship line, 
one in complete alignment with the color line, can of course be seen earlier, embodied in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which  the Supreme Court held that African-Americans, whether 
slaves or free persons, were racially barred from U.S. citizenship. 60 U.S. (19. How.) 393, 
404 (1857). 
167 See infra notes 210–235 and accompanying text. 
168 See infra notes 236–255 and accompanying text. 
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federal immigration restriction.169 As the Commissioner General of 
Immigration stated in his annual report in 1905, the officers of the Bu-
reau of Immigration were “ever alert and willing, equally efficient in 
detecting the inadmissible alien and the pretended citizen.”170 
 The problem of distinguishing citizens from noncitizens arose 
from the combination of two roughly contemporaneous developments 
in the late nineteenth century: the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the enactment of the first federal immigration restrictions. 
With the 1868 passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United 
States adopted a constitutional guarantee of birthright citizenship for 
those born within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, creat-
ing for the first time a form of U.S. citizenship free of racial restric-
tions.171 Seven years later, Congress enacted the first federal immigra-
tion restrictions in the form of the Page Act, a facially race-neutral law 
regarding the exclusion of prostitutes and contract laborers that was 
primarily intended to exclude Chinese women.172 The Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese laborers from entering the 
United States, soon followed.173 Thus, U.S. citizenship opened up 
across racial lines at virtually the same time that the border started clos-
ing in racially specific ways.174 
                                                                                                                      
169 See Dep’t of Treasury, Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of Immi-
gration to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 
30, 1905, at 111 (1905). 
170 Id. 
171 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. Racial restrictions limited citizenship through 
naturalization until 1952. Ian Haney López, White by Law 31–34 (2006); see Act of 
March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1952) (imposing racial restrictions on natu-
ralization). Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, birthright citizenship was 
racially restricted under the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 
404; see also Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus 
Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1492–93 (2011) (explaining the 
less explicit role played by race in citizenship by descent). 
172 Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 641, 643 (2005) (“The text, legislative history, historical context, and en-
forcement of the Page Law indicate that one of its animating purposes was to prevent the 
Chinese practices of polygamy and prostitution from gaining a foothold in the United 
States.”); see Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). 
173 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). 
174 For an insightful discussion of the connection between the end of slavery and the 
beginning of federal immigration restrictions, see Neuman, supra note 125, at 51 (“The 
uncoupling of migration from slavery as a result of the Civil War made federal regulation 
possible . . . .”); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave 
Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 921, 922–24 (2012) (discussing schol-
arship on the connection between slavery and immigration restrictions). 
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 Historians of the Chinese Exclusion era have documented the ways 
in which the complex dynamic between the Fourteenth Amendment 
and racially targeted immigration laws played out in the decisions of 
immigration inspectors.175 In an era in which passports were optional 
and many births went unrecorded, Chinese Americans returning to the 
United States from China often had little documentation to prove their 
citizenship claims.176 In a substantial proportion of adjudications at 
ports of entry, the decision to admit or exclude hinged on a citizenship 
claim,177 and immigration officials suspected (with good reason) that a 
large number of such claims were false.178 The presence of citizens 
among the arrivals in China—and in particular, citizens without clear 
documentation of citizenship status—thus created a conundrum.179 
Immigration officials had unparalleled discretion to decide whom to 
admit and whom to turn away;180 yet their authority extended only to 
noncitizens.181 By what procedures should citizenship status be deter-
mined? In other words, on which side of the plenary power doctrine 
did citizenship claims lie? 
 Agency officials were unequivocal in their response: citizenship 
claims were like any other claim to an exemption from the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act and were subject to identical treatment.182 Such treatment 
could include being held in cramped and unsanitary conditions for 
months,183 subjected to questioning without the assistance of coun-
                                                                                                                      
 United States as “paper sons.” Salyer, supra note 
155 merican citizen of Chinese descent would claim the 
birt visit to China and would sell the right to enter the United States 
, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); In re 
Tom  
175 See, e.g., Erika Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration During the Ex-
clusion Era, 1882–1943, at 100–09, 200–07 (2003); Salyer, supra note 155, at 69–91. 
176 See Lee, supra note 175, at 100–09, 200–07. 
177 Salyer, supra note 155, at 272 n.168 (stating that “70 percent of the Chinese re-
fused admission at San Francisco in 1898 were those claiming to be born in the United 
States, who relied solely on testimony to support their cases”). 
178 See Lee, supra note 175, at 200–07; Salyer, supra note 155, at 44. For example, 
many Chinese immigrants entered the
, at 44. Under this practice, an A
h of a son following a 
as his son to a young Chinese man. Id. 
179 Salyer, supra note 155, at 44. 
180 See id. at 109, 166. 
181 See The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126
 Yum, 64 F. 485, 489 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
182 See Lee, supra note 175, at 106–09 (discussing the treatment of citizenship claims by 
inspectors); Salyer, supra note 155, at 98–101 (same). 
183 See Salyer, supra note 155, at 166. 
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sel.184 Attorneys were not permitted to examine evidence until after a 
decision had been reached,185 and appeals had to be filed within two 
days of the adjudicator’s decision.186 
 Agency officials also imported the so-called “white witness” rule 
mandated by Congress with regard to claims by Chinese immigrants 
into the realm of citizenship determinations.187 The Geary Act of 1892 
provided that Chinese laborers who had come to the United States be-
fore the effective date of the law would be deported if they could not 
produce either an official record or the testimony of a “credible white 
witness” attesting to their timely arrival in the United States.188 In 1893, 
Congress enacted a law requiring Chinese merchants returning to the 
United States to produce not only a certificate from the Chinese gov-
ernment attesting to their merchant status but also “two credible wit-
nesses other than Chinese” to attest that they had previously conducted 
business as a merchant in the United States.189 Congress never man-
dated such rules for citizenship claims.190 Nevertheless, John Wise, the 
customs collector in San Francisco from 1892 to 1898, imposed a re-
quirement that anyone of Chinese descent claiming U.S. citizenship 
had to prove such a claim through the testimony of two white wit-
nesses.191 His successor tried to ease up on this requirement, but he was 
swiftly reprimanded by the Secretary of the Treasury.192 
 Although immigration agency officials were happy to treat Chinese 
Americans just like Chinese immigrants, federal judges found the ques-
tion of alleged citizens more vexing. One of the most striking aspects of 
the cases from these early days of immigration restriction is the confes-
sion by courts of their uncertainty about the facts before them. A judge 
                                                                                                                      
184 Id. at 166 (“[I]n 1907, the [B]ureau [of Immigration] conceded to Chinese the right 
to have an attorney and interpreter present during admission hearings, though they were 
forbidden to participate in the proceeding.”). 
185 Id. at 109. 
186 Id. at 166. In 1906, the time for appeal was lengthened to five days. Id. 
187 Id. at 65. 
188 Geary Act, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (repealed 1943); see also Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (upholding the white witness rule). 
189 Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, § 2, 28 Stat. 7, 8 (repealed 1943); see also Li Sing v. Unit-
ed States, 180 U.S. 486, 495 (1901) (upholding the Act of November 3, 1893). The 1893 
amendments also altered the wording of the provision regarding Chinese laborers, chang-
ing “credible white witness” to “one credible witness other than Chinese.” Act of Nov. 3, 
1893, ch. 14, § 2. 
190 Salyer, supra note 155, at 65. 
191 Lee, supra note 175, at 106; Salyer, supra note 155, at 65. 
192 Salyer, supra note 155, at 66. 
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in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
marked in 1911, “It is impossible in this class of cases to be sure what 
the truth is.”193 Elaborating on the difficulty of fact finding in such cas-
es, the judge went on to explain that citizenship claims are “easily fabri-
cated, and . . . difficult to be disproved. . . . It is easy to decide such cas-
es on the theory that all such claims are false. Probably many of them 
are false, but some of them must be true . . . .”194 A federal judge in Cal-
ifornia wrote to a California congressman, “[I]f you could have at-
tended court and listened to the hearing of any of these cases, you 
ou
6 In 1894, Congress en-
te
lien was not just an ordinary 
fact, but rather was “the very fact upon which the jurisdiction of [immi-
gration enforcement] depends.”200 
w ld have recognized how . . . impossible it is to distinguish a genuine 
case from a fraudulent one.”195 
 The distinction between citizenship claims and other types of ex-
emptions from the Chinese Exclusion Acts became especially signifi-
cant in the early 1890s, when the Supreme Court and Congress severely 
curtailed judicial review of immigration cases. In 1892, the Supreme 
Court in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States held that an inspector’s factual 
determinations with regard to a noncitizen’s excludability were final 
unless Congress provided for judicial review.19
ac d legislation providing that the inspector’s decision was subject to 
review only by the Secretary of the Treasury.197 
 Following these developments, federal courts faced the question 
whether citizenship claims merited special treatment.198 Judge William 
Morrow of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia concluded in the 1894 case In re Tom Yum199 that they did. Holding 
that those claiming to be citizens would be permitted to continue filing 
habeas corpus petitions, the court explained that the determination 
whether an applicant was a citizen or an a
                                                                                                                      
193 United States v. Leu Jin, 192 F. 580, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (referring to cases in which 
arri
rom Judge Hoffman to 
Cal
, 390 (repealed 1943). 
d States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 255, 263 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck, 
194 
 
ving passengers from China claimed citizenship by virtue of birth in the United States). 
194 Leu Jin, 192 F. at 580. 
195 Salyer, supra note 155, at 78 (quoting correspondence f
ifornia Congressman Charles N. Felton). 
196 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
197 Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372
198 See e.g., Unite
U.S. 161, 168 (1904); Tom Yum, 64 F. at 490. 
199 64 F. at 490. 
200 Tom Yum, 64 F. at 490. The writ of habeas corpus allows a person in government cus-
tody to challenge the legality of the confinement. Id. at 487; Black’s Law Dictionary 788 
(9th ed. 2009). On the role of habeas corpus in judicial review of deportation and exclu-
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 The Supreme Court, however, was not as quick to reach this con-
clusion. Following the defeat of a Congressional bill that would have 
barred habeas review of citizenship claims, the Court decided two cases 
that together dramatically reduced the power of such review.201 In 
1904, in United States v. Sing Tuck, the Court held that U.S. citizens seek-
ing writs of habeas corpus had to first exhaust administrative reme-
dies.202 In 1905, in United States v. Ju Toy, the Court held that the fact 
finding of the agency was final, even on the question of citizenship.203 
In the eyes of the Court, there was no reason to exempt such claims 
from the general principles enunciated in the plenary power cases: 
                                                                                                                     
If, for the purpose of argument, we assume that the 5th 
Amendment applies to him, and that to deny entrance to a 
citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of opin-
ion that with regard to him due process of law does not re-
quire judicial trial. That is the result of the [plenary power] 
cases which we have cited, and the almost necessary result of 
the power of Congress to pass exclusion laws.204 
In short, citizenship claims were just another part of immigration adju-
dication. Although the Court flirted with applying the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it quickly reverted to a plenary power 
analysis.205 
 
sion proceedings, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 459, 461–66 (2006); Rachel E. Ros-
enbloom, Is the Attorney General the Custodian of an INS Detainee? Personal Jurisdiction and the 
“Immediate Custodian” Rule in Immigration-Related Habeas Actions, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 543, 547–51 (2002); Jonathan Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas 
Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 Yale L.J. 2509, 2521–2536 (1998). The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California’s 1894 decision in In re Tom Yum turned 
on whether citizenship was a jurisdictional question or a mere question of fact properly 
within the custom officials’ jurisdiction. 64 F. at 487. 
201 See Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263; Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. at 168; Salyer, supra note 155, at 111. 
202 194 U.S. at 169. The petitioners in Sing Tuck stated to the border official that they 
were born in the United States. Id. at 166. After being denied entry, they were informed of 
their right to an administrative appeal, which they refused and instead filed a writ of ha-
beas corpus. Id. Justice David Brewer wrote a vigorous dissent. See id. at 173 (Brewer, J., 
dissenting) (“Why should any one who claims the right of citizenship be denied prompt 
access to the courts? If it be an ‘inestimable heritage,’ can Congress deprive one of the 
right to a judicial determination of its existence, and ought the courts to unnecessarily 
avoid or postpone an inquiry thereof?”). 
203 198 U.S. at 263. 
204 Id. As a result of Sing Tuck and Ju Toy, the number of habeas petitions plummeted. 
See Salyer, supra note 155, at 170. 
205 See Sing Tuck, 198 U.S. at 263. 
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 Three years later, in 1908, the Supreme Court adopted a more 
sympathetic tone in Chin Yow v. United States.206 It recognized that “[t]he 
statutes purport to exclude aliens only” and concluded that the fact-
finding powers of immigration enforcement agencies must “yield” to the 
rights of citizens to enter the country and of alleged citizens to prove 
their citizenship.207 The Court limited its decision in Chin Yow, however, 
to claims of procedural irregularities in the determination of citizen-
ship.208 Those whose citizenship claims were rejected by agency adjudi-
cators in proceedings that conformed to the relatively lax procedural 
requirements at ports of entry still had no recourse to the courts.209 
B. Efforts to Solve the Problem of Citizenship 
 Although the Supreme Court signaled an unwillingness to carve 
out protections for citizenship cases, some circuit courts sought ways to 
set such cases apart by interpreting Ju Toy and Sing Tuck narrowly. For 
example, the 1906 case Moy Suey v. United States involved a man taken 
into custody within the United States and charged with being a Chinese 
laborer present without authorization.210 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit distinguished the case from Supreme Court prece-
dent concerning individuals apprehended at the border.211 While rec-
ognizing that Congress “unquestionably” had the power to exclude 
noncitizens and to prescribe the conditions under which such exclu-
sion took place, the court held that it was an “entirely different” matter 
when a person present in the United States claimed citizenship.212 “Na-
tivity gives citizenship, and is a right under the Constitution,” the court 
reasoned. “It is a right that congress would be without constitutional 
power to curtail or give away. It is a right to be adjudicated in the 
courts, in the usual and ordinary way of adjudicating constitutional 
rights. No rule of evidence may fritter it away.”213 
                                                                                                                      
 
206 See 208 U.S. 8, 12 (1908). 
207 Id.; see also Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 235 U.S. 454, 464 (1920) (holding that judicial 
review was available where crucial testimony was left out of the record upon which a de-
termination was made). 
208 208 U.S. at 11 (“If the petitioner was not denied a fair opportunity to produce the 
evidence that he desired, or a fair though summary hearing, the case can proceed no far-
ther.”). 
209 See id. 
210 147 F. 697, 697 (7th Cir. 1906). 
211 Id. at 698. 
212 Id. 
213 Id.; see also Gee Cue Beng, 184 F. at 385–86 (citing Moy Suey, 147 F. at 697) (holding 
that an individual apprehended within the United States was entitled to judicial review of 
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 By the 1920s, the racial and political landscape of immigration re-
striction had begun to change.214 Documents, including visas and U.S. 
passports, were coming into wider use, and a shift was occurring at the 
border from examining bodies to examining papers.215 Further, Euro-
pean immigrants were now subject to numerical quotas.216 The Palmer 
Raids in 1919 had snared many European immigrants suspected of be-
ing subversives, some of whom turned out to be citizens.217 With immi-
gration enforcement now affecting immigrants across racial lines, re-
formers began raising concerns about its harshness.218 
 Against the backdrop of these changes, the Supreme Court came 
to recognize special protections for citizenship cases. Two deportation 
cases consolidated in the 1922 case Ng Fung Ho v. White concerned indi-
viduals claiming to be U.S. citizens by virtue of their births abroad to 
U.S. citizen fathers.219 Immigration enforcement officials subjected 
them to lengthy inquiries upon their arrival in the United States and 
deemed them to be citizens.220 Months after their admissions, they 
were arrested, charged with being Chinese laborers present without 
authorization, and ordered deported.221 Although the Court found no 
                                                                                                                      
his claim that he was born in the United States); Pang Sho Yin v. United States, 154 F. 660, 
662 (6th Cir. 1907) (same). 
214 See generally Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction 
and Deportation in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. 69 (2003) (describing 
the significant changes in immigration restrictions beginning in the 1920s). 
215 Craig Robertson, The Passport in America: The History of a Document 160–
83 (2010) (discussing the focus on bodies); id. at 184–214 (discussing the transition to 
documents). 
216 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1965); Act of 
May 19, 1921, ch. 8, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1965); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America 21 (2005) (discussing 
the history of national origins quotas). 
217 See Salyer, supra note 155, at 233 (discussing the case of a U.S. citizen detained in 
the Palmer Raids). During the Palmer Raids, authorities arrested 10,000 immigrants sus-
pected of being anarchists and deported 500 of them. Ngai, supra note 214, at 74. 
218 Ngai, supra note 214, at 90 (“[T]he protest against unjust deportations stemmed 
from the fact that European and Canadian immigrants had come face-to-face with a system 
that had historically evolved to justify arbitrary and summary treatment of Chinese and 
other Asian immigrants.”); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation 159 (2007) 
(“The government’s use of its deportation power has rarely inspired as much passion as it 
did in the aftermath of the Palmer Raids.”); Salyer, supra note 155, at 211 (connecting 
the Palmer Raids to a new focus  within the courts on the rights of U.S. citizens within 
immigration enforcement). 
219 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 281–82. 
220 Id. at 282. 
221 Id. 
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procedural irregularities that warranted judicial review, it held that re-
view was available based merely on the nature of the facts at issue.222 
Echoing Judge Morrow’s decision in In re Tom Yum, the Court reasoned 
that “[j]urisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if 
the person arrested is an alien. The claim of citizenship is thus a denial 
of an essential jurisdictional fact.”223 The Court held: 
                                                                                                                     
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives 
him of liberty . . . [and may] result also in loss of both prop-
erty and life, or of all that makes life worth living. Against the 
danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by 
judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection 
in its guarantee of due process of law.224 
 In Ng Fung Ho, the Supreme Court finally embraced a notion that 
had been percolating for several decades in the lower courts: that citi-
zenship claims should be set apart from the rest of immigration law.225 
Ng Fung Ho represents the beginning of the Supreme Court’s recogni-
tion of a doctrine of citizenship exceptionalism. Statutory and adminis-
trative developments over the course of the twentieth century have bol-
stered this doctrine. For example, in 1961, when Congress added a 
judicial review provision to the INA, it included special procedures for 
citizenship claims, according them de novo review in the federal 
courts.226 Citizenship claims have continued to be subject to de novo 
review in recent years, even as Congress has stripped the courts of ju-
risdiction to review many other aspects of removal proceedings.227 Over 
the past two decades, as Congress has enacted fast-track removal proce-
 
222 Id. at 284. 
223 See id.; Tom Yum, 64 F. at 290. 
224 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. 
225 See id. at 284–85. 
226 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, sec. 5, § 106, 75 Stat. 650, 651 
(1961) (repealed 1996). 
227 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (2012) (providing for de novo judicial review of citi-
zenship claims), with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (barring judicial review of a variety of removal 
defenses), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (providing for deferential standard of review on is-
sues other than citizenship). Commentary has been critical of the court-stripping provi-
sions of the 1996 amendments to the INA. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judi-
cial Review of Removal Orders, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 233 (1998); Lee Galernt, The 1996 
Immigration Legislation and the Assault on the Courts, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 455 (2001); Lucas 
Guttentag, Immigrants’ Rights in the Courts and Congress: Constitutional Protections and the Rule 
of Law After 9/11, 25 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 11, 17 (2007); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and 
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1615, 
1630–31 (2000). 
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dures that bypass the immigration courts entirely,228 it has to some ex-
tent included special carve-outs for citizenship claims. For example, 
since 1996, noncitizens apprehended at or near the border who have 
no entry documents or have documents that are deemed fraudulent 
face expedited removal without access to counsel or the opportunity 
for a hearing before an immigration judge.229 A citizenship claim raised 
within expedited removal, however, triggers a full hearing before an 
immigration judge, the right to counsel, and the right to appeal the 
immigration judge’s order.230 Under Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) case law, those deemed subject to mandatory detention may 
nevertheless request a hearing to argue that, as U.S. citizens, they 
should be released.231 
 In the wake of publicity over Peter Guzman’s case, ICE issued 
guidance on the treatment of citizenship claims. The guidance directs 
ICE officers to consult with the Office of Chief Counsel in cases that 
exhibit “some probative evidence” of citizenship.232 It prohibits the de-
tention of the individual making the claim when the “evidence of U.S. 
citizenship outweighs evidence to the contrary.”233 Further, if an indi-
vidual makes a claim to U.S. citizenship either before or after ICE offi-
cers serve her with a Notice to Appear at a removal proceeding, ICE 
must “fully investigate the merits” of such claim and make such an in-
                                                                                                                      
228 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A) (expedited removal); 1228(b) (administrative 
removal); 1231(a)(5) (reinstatement of removal). 
229 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5) (2013). 
230 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5) (providing for referral to immigration judge in expedited 
removal proceeding where a citizenship claim is made). Another fast-track procedure, 
administrative removal, allows for the speedy removal of individuals who are not lawful 
permanent residents and who have certain criminal convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). The 
relevant regulations fail to specify a carve-out for citizenship claims, but they do provide 
for referral to an immigration judge for a full removal hearing where the officer deter-
mines that the individual is “not amenable to [administrative] removal,” which presumably 
includes a nonfrivolous citizenship claim. 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(iii). In fact, Mark Lyttle was 
initially ordered removed through the administrative removal process but then appeared 
before an immigration judge because he raised a citizenship claim. See Lyttle Complaint, 
supra note 101 at 19; supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text (describing Mark Lyttle’s 
case). 
231 See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 806 (B.I.A. 1999). In In re Joseph, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that a lawful permanent resident was entitled to a hearing on 
whether he was properly included in the category of those subject to mandatory detention. 
Id. at 800. A person claiming citizenship could make use of a “Joseph hearing” to argue that 
the government was unlikely to meet its burden to establish alienage and that mandatory 
detention was therefore not applicable. 
232 See Guidance on Citizenship Claims, supra note 122, at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
233 Id. 
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vestigation a priority.234 The individual must be released if after the in-
vestigation the officer determines that the individual’s claim is “credi-
ble on its face” or if there is “probative evidence” that the individual is a 
U.S. citizen.235 
C. The Long Shadow of Immigration Law 
 The reforms that began with Ng Fung Ho and that are now embod-
ied in legislation, regulations, and agency policies are intended to draw 
a line between citizenship claims and the rest of the removal process.236 
Together, these safeguards comprise the architecture of the citizenship 
line. Yet these safeguards are not comprehensive even on a formal lev-
el. The starkest example of this is reinstatement of removal, a common 
fast-track procedure through which those with former removal orders 
can be subsequently removed with no hearing; the reinstatement stat-
ute provides no exception for citizenship claims.237 Moreover, citizen-
ship claims made at the border continue to enjoy fewer protections 
than those made in the interior.238 
                                                                                                                      
 
234 Id. at 2. 
235 Id. 
236 As already noted, this line has been most clear with regard to factual disputes about 
whether a particular person is or is not a citizen. See supra note 157 and accompanying 
text. The line has been less clear with regard to substantive challenges to the statutory 
requirements for citizenship. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
237 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); see Terán, supra note 4, at 655–75 (discussing the ef-
fects of the reinstatement statute on U.S. citizens and arguing that the statute is unconsti-
tutional). Although the reinstatement statute contains no carve-out for citizenship claims, 
a person subject to reinstatement may file a petition for review in a federal circuit court of 
appeals. For a recent example of such a case, see Iracheta v. Holder, No. 12-60087, 2013 
WL 4836087, at *3–6 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2013) (remanding with instructions to vacate rein-
stated order upon a finding of citizenship). The Fifth Circuit’s 2013 decision in Iracheta v. 
Holder serves as a perfect illustration of the issues explored in this Article, as it involves an 
individual who has been a U.S. citizen since birth but was subject to deportation in 1992, 
1995, and 1999. Id. at *1. The petitioner, Sigifredo Saldana Iracheta, was again deported in 
2012 when DHS reinstated his 1999 removal order, after finding that he had not made a 
probative claim to citizenship. Id. Along the way, Saldana Iracheta had filed applications 
for a certificate of citizenship in 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007, all of which had been denied 
due to the lack of sufficient documentation of his father’s physical presence in the United 
States. Id. 
238 For example, if ICE apprehends a U.S. citizen within the United States and places 
her in removal proceedings, the government has the burden to establish alienage by clear 
and convincing evidence, just as the government would have the burden to establish any 
ground of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). When someone seeking admission to 
the United States claims to be a citizen, however, the burden of proving citizenship lies 
with the applicant. See id. § 1229a(a)(2)(A); In re G— R—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 141, 154 (B.I.A. 
1948). Further, like anyone else seeking admission at a port of entry, a person who claims 
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 Perhaps most significantly, even where statute and case law provide 
robust protections for citizenship claims, immigration exceptionalism 
continues to shape the conditions under which such claims arise (or, 
more to the point, are foreclosed). The cases described in Part I illus-
trate the extent to which citizenship determinations occur deep inside 
a system that has been profoundly shaped by immigration exceptional-
ism. As illustrated by the examples provided in Part I, cases in which 
U.S. citizens have been deported generally involve individuals who con-
cede alienage while in custody, without the benefit of counsel.239 These 
conditions have become more prevalent in recent years as immigration 
                                                                                                                      
U.S. citizenship has no statutory right to counsel. Representation and Appearances: Clari-
fying Right to Representation, 45 Fed Reg. 81,732 (Dec. 12, 1980) (clarifying 8 C.F.R. 
§ 292); see 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (2013); Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in 
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border. See supra notes 53–66, 86–100 and accompanying text. Detention severely limits the 
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Cuahtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving 
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13% of nondetained respondents without counsel, and 74% of nondetained respondents 
with counsel); see also Kanstroom, supra note 135, at 1511 (describing disparities between 
represented and unrepresented respondents in removal proceedings). 
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detention rates have ballooned,240 with 84% of detainees lacking legal 
representation.241 Many of the key issues that influence the outcome of 
a removal proceeding—including, above all, the decision of individuals 
to accept removal rather than pursuing an appeal—can be traced to 
the inherently coercive nature of confinement.242 Pressures to give up 
citizenship claims are particularly acute at the most informal end of the 
spectrum, for instance when U.S. citizens sign stipulated orders of re-
moval,243 agree to voluntarily depart, or withdraw applications for ad-
mission at the border. A case such as Antonio’s, however, shows that the 
prospect of spending years in detention can affect the actions of those 
in formal proceedings before immigration judges as well. 
 To grasp how the procedural norms of immigration law impact 
U.S. citizens, consider the experience of Mario Guerrero, a U.S. citizen 
who was deported from the United States twice and spent a quarter of 
his life in prison on charges of illegal reentry before a court recognized 
his citizenship claim. The former INS categorized Guerrero as a lawful 
permanent resident when he moved from Mexico to the United States 
with his U.S. citizen father as a child.244 He and his siblings, however, 
had suspected for many years that they might be citizens on the basis of 
their father’s U.S. citizenship.245 Guerrero was deported following a 
criminal conviction in 1993.246 In a 2009 interview, he explained that 
he did not pursue his citizenship claim at that point due to the pros-
pect of a lengthy detention: 
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[T]hey told me, “You fight deportation or you sign the paper. 
If you don’t sign, you might spend a year here.” All I wanted 
to do is get out because I already spent a year. I signed the pa-
per and I got out. They told me I was giving up my rights but 
nothing was for sure. I could spend another year in jail or get 
out.247 
He later returned to the United States, was imprisoned for illegal reen-
try following removal, and eventually was deported again.248 When 
Guerrero was asked in a subsequent interview whether he raised his 
citizenship claim in this second deportation proceeding, he responded: 
No, [the adjudicator] never addressed me individually. There 
was no lawyer, no nothing. He was just reading the thing that 
we were getting deported. He talked some stuff. I don’t re-
member what he said. He just talked for 10 to 20 minutes. 
They just figured I was deported before, so they just say we’re 
going to deport him again. I didn’t do no talking, no nothing. 
I just had to be there in a little room, and then they took me 
back to my cell and that was it.249 
 Mario Guerrero’s words illustrate the barriers that U.S. citizens 
encounter within the immigration adjudication system. There is more 
to his story, however, and his description of his subsequent experience 
sheds further light on the relationship between procedural safeguards 
and the adjudication of citizenship claims. Guerrero reentered the 
United States a second time, and was once again prosecuted for illegal 
reentry.250 This time, his court-appointed criminal defense attorney 
investigated his citizenship claim as a potential defense to the reentry 
charge.251 She ultimately proved that he was a U.S. citizen on the basis 
of evidence provided by Guerrero’s father regarding Guerrero’s 
grandmother’s marriage in the United States and the father’s own fre-
quent trips across the border.252 
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 Guerrero’s case demonstrates an ironic byproduct of the crimi-
nalization of immigration law, namely the increased chances that non-
citizens (or U.S. citizens who have been designated as noncitizens) will 
receive appointed counsel. As illustrated by Guerrero’s and Antonio’s 
cases, some deported U.S. citizens later reenter the United States and 
are criminally prosecuted on charges of illegal reentry.253 As criminal 
defendants, they are entitled to appointed counsel without regard to 
their immigration status.254 Citizenship is a defense to an illegal reentry 
charge, and thus a number of citizenship claims have come to light 
through the efforts of counsel to defend against such charges.255 
IV. Rethinking Citizenship, Rethinking Exceptionalism 
 Thus far, this Article has highlighted the disjuncture between the 
doctrinal scheme, which appears to insulate citizens from the govern-
ment’s broad immigration powers, and the actual operation of the de-
tention and deportation system, past and present. How should we make 
sense of this disjuncture? Although it may seem obvious that the depor-
tation of a U.S. citizen signals a problem within the immigration system, 
there are multiple ways of answering the questions of what the problem 
is and why (or even if) it should trouble us. Section A explores these 
questions and ultimately argues that deportations of U.S. citizens are 
not ordinary examples of jurisdictional disputes or adjudicatory errors 
but rather reveal deep contradictions within immigration jurispru-
dence.256 Sections B, C, and D then consider what an understanding of 
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the citizenship line might contribute to both scholarly discussions 
about the nature of citizenship and practical responses to the deporta-
tion of U.S. citizens. Section B argues that the procedural norms of 
immigration enforcement play an underexplored role in shaping the 
functional boundaries of citizenship and should prompt a reconsidera-
tion of the relationship between citizenship as a legal status and citizen-
ship in the broader sense of full membership in society.257 Section C 
argues that the adjudication of citizenship claims continues to be racial-
ized, albeit in ways that are less obvious than they were a century ago.258 
Finally, Section D argues that the appropriate response to the deporta-
tion of U.S. citizens is not to strengthen citizen-specific safeguards but 
rather to pursue a wholesale reconsideration of the procedural norms 
of immigration enforcement.259 
A. The Problem of Citizenship 
 By definition, the deportation of a U.S. citizen represents a failure 
within the immigration adjudication system. But does it represent a 
problem for the system as a whole? If so, what kind of problem? 
 One possible response is that the “problem” of citizenship claims 
within immigration enforcement is not really a problem at all but rather 
a variation on a theme that has already been extensively addressed with-
in the law. It is well established that courts and agency adjudicators have 
initial jurisdiction to determine if a case falls under their own jurisdic-
tion, a feature of the legal system that inevitably results in some hardship 
for those who are wrongly named in a proceeding.260 Given that litigants 
in a variety of contexts must frequently submit to a particular forum for 
the purposes of arguing that the forum lacks jurisdiction, one might ask 
whether it is any more troubling to compel an individual to establish 
citizenship before an immigration judge as a threshold jurisdictional 
question. 
                                                                                                                      
257 See infra notes 268–294 and accompanying text. 
258 See infra notes 295–314 and accompanying text. 
259 See infra notes 315–326 and accompanying text. 
260 See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 49–50 (1938). When faced with a case in 
which a civil defendant questioned on grounds of personal jurisdiction the authority of a 
court to impose sanctions for failure to comply with jurisdiction-related discovery requests, 
the Supreme Court described the petitioner as “attempting to create a logical conundrum 
out of a fairly straightforward matter.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Gui-
nee, 456 U.S. 694, 696 (1982). 
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 Another possible response is that deportations of U.S. citizens 
simply illustrate the impossibility of constructing an error-free adjudica-
tion system. The detention and occasional deportation of some num-
ber of U.S. citizens among the hundreds of thousands of people who 
cycle through immigration enforcement every year is, in this view, the 
result of a small but inevitable error rate.261 Innocent people are some-
times convicted of crimes, and civil defendants who have done nothing 
wrong sometimes face legal liability. It is widely accepted that no adju-
dication system can be entirely error-free. 
 Each of these arguments contains an element of validity. It would 
be difficult to imagine a functioning system of immigration enforce-
ment that lacked any power to take action against those who claim to 
be citizens. Indeed, many citizenship claims turn out to be invalid, ei-
ther because of questions of law that are resolved in the government’s 
favor or because the claim was simply false. Thus, as long as there is 
some sort of immigration restriction that is being enforced, it is inevi-
table that some number of U.S. citizens may have to prove their citizen-
ship as a threshold jurisdictional question. Furthermore, if one con-
cedes that some U.S. citizens will enter this system, one must also 
recognize the possibility that some adjudication errors may occur.262 
 Yet ultimately this response is unsatisfying, for reasons that are 
rooted in the citizenship line. No discussion of adjudicatory error takes 
place in a vacuum. Rather, risk of error is inextricably linked to the de-
gree of procedural safeguards imposed.263 For well over a century, the 
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Supreme Court has signaled its willingness to tolerate procedural 
norms in immigration enforcement that it will not tolerate in other 
contexts, based on the principle that the government has plenary pow-
er when controlling the right of noncitizens to enter or remain within 
its sovereign territory.264 A fundamental premise of this system is that 
U.S. citizens are not subject to such powers.265 This premise has en-
abled the Supreme Court to countenance conditions within the immi-
gration enforcement system—summary proceedings, lengthy deten-
tion, lack of counsel—that it has not tolerated in either the criminal 
context or in civil contexts that implicate similar interests, such as civil 
commitment and juvenile detention.266 Yet if one takes seriously the 
role of immigration enforcement in drawing the boundaries of citizen-
ship, a system premised on the maintenance of two sets of procedural 
norms begins to collapse in on itself. Without a stable citizenship line 
upon which to rely, any procedural distinction between citizens and 
noncitizens becomes difficult to justify, even if the Court’s jurispru-
dence on the substantive rights of noncitizens remains intact. Far from 
being ordinary jurisdictional disputes, citizenship claims reveal a deep 
contradiction at the heart of the doctrinal framework that undergirds 
immigration enforcement—a framework that has served to keep such 
enforcement analytically separate from other areas of the law that in-
volve analogous assertions of state power against individuals. 
B. The Boundaries of Citizenship 
 If the citizenship line does indeed reveal an unresolved problem at 
the core of the doctrine that governs immigration enforcement, what 
conclusions might be drawn from this insight? One area in which this 
insight may be of use is in conceptualizing the nature of citizenship as a 
legal status and its relationship to citizenship in the broader sense of 
full membership in society. 
 Over the past two decades, citizenship has captured the attention 
of scholars across a wide range of disciplines.267 Much of this work has 
started from the premise that there is a disjuncture between citizenship 
status (generally conceived as a yes-or-no question) and the identity or 
rights associated with citizenship (generally conceived as defying easy 
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dichotomies).268 Those advocating for expansive definitions of mem-
bership, particularly with regard to undocumented immigrants, have 
sought to disaggregate territoriality, affiliation, and legal status and to 
reconceptualize their relationship to membership.269 For example, 
Linda Bosniak has argued that “our conception of citizenship must be a 
divided one. It must be a conception that approaches citizenship status 
and citizenship rights as analytically distinct facets of citizenship which 
are not always in alignment.”270 
 While normative arguments within the field of membership theory 
have generally sought to expand the rights of noncitizens by decoup-
ling membership from legal status, scholarship within the fields of his-
tory and critical race theory has often approached the disjuncture from 
the other side. This work has focused on the experiences of those who 
possess formal citizenship status but have been denied full membership 
rights through marginalization along lines of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality.271 Of particular relevance here, a subset of this work focuses 
on the phenomenon of “alien citizenship,” the denial of full member-
ship rights to those U.S. citizens racially marked as foreign.272 Historian 
Mae Ngai describes alien citizenship as presenting an inherent contra-
diction: “the nullification of the rights of citizenship—from the right to 
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be territorially present to the range of civil rights and liberties—without 
formal revocation of citizenship status.”273 Critical race theorist Devon 
Carbado has extended the concept of alien citizenship to argue that 
naturalization is “not simply . . . a formal process that produces Ameri-
can citizenship but also . . . a social process that produces American 
racial identities.”274 He has described this process of “racial naturaliza-
tion” as being “simultaneously a process of exclusion and inclusion. 
Underwriting these claims is a distinction between American identity, 
on the one hand, and American citizenship, on the other.”275 
 Cases in which U.S. citizens have been deported should lead us to 
reevaluate the relationship between citizenship-as-status and citizen-
ship-as-membership. Such cases show that alien citizenship can signal 
not only a disjuncture between status and rights, but also a shifting of 
the boundaries of formal status itself. Although we may take it for 
granted that citizenship-as-membership is a complex and multifaceted 
question, perhaps we need to view citizenship status through a similar 
lens. What would it mean to approach citizenship status as something 
other than the relatively clear-cut, yes-or-no question it is generally as-
sumed to be? 
 Scholarship on legal indeterminacy has shown that judicial and 
administrative processes that purport to sort people by status can at 
times produce the very categories that they seek to police. For example, 
immigration adjudicators of the Chinese Exclusion era distinguished 
Chinese laborers (barred under the Chinese Exclusion Acts) from ex-
empt classes such as merchants, students, and travelers.276 Although the 
statutory language implied that distinguishing merchants from laborers 
was a simple task, the administrative record reveals that “‘merchant’ 
status was fluid and shifting, and inspectors repeatedly encountered 
difficulties discerning class status by its presumed physical markers, par-
ticularly as these markers came to be used by the Chinese as a way to 
construct a ‘passable’ identity.”277 
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 Scholarship on the legal construction of racial categories has ex-
plored similar themes. Ian Haney López has examined how courts 
dealt with challenges to the racial restrictions that were contained in 
the naturalization laws until 1952.278 In ruling on challenges brought 
by immigrants claiming to be white for the purpose of naturalization, 
courts employed two different epistemologies, relying alternately on 
“scientific” and “common sense” understandings of race, reaching vary-
ing results depending on their chosen method.279 Ariela Gross has used 
“race trials” in nineteenth and early-twentieth century America, includ-
ing freedom suits by slaves and cases in which race was relevant to issues 
such as access to education, the admissibility of testimony, or property 
distribution, to show that race “could be based, at different times, on 
appearance, ancestry, performance, reputation, associations, science, 
national citizenship, and cultural practice.”280 These examples demon-
strate that categories such as race and class are not self-evident but ra-
ther are constructed through legal and social practices.281 
 Citizenship status does not, perhaps, fall neatly into this para-
digm. As a legal status conferred by the state, citizenship is a question 
that genuinely does have only two possible answers—yes or no—in a 
way that questions about race and class clearly do not. Nevertheless, 
cases of U.S. citizens who become entangled in immigration enforce-
ment reveal that citizenship is constructed in distinct but related ways. 
Citizenship status may be potentially knowable in a way that race or 
class are not, for example through a birth certificate on file or 
through evidence that may exist to prove a parent’s birth and requi-
site residence in the United States.282 Yet the fact-finding procedures 
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at issue profoundly shape the evidentiary records available to adjudi-
cators in such cases, and thus citizenship status, although knowable, 
remains unknown to the adjudicators making key determinations.283 
Such cases present an epistemological problem for a system predi-
cated on a threshold status inquiry and suggest the need for a more 
complex understanding of citizenship as a formal status. 
 Scholarship by political scientist Kamal Sadiq on unauthorized 
migrants within Asia has identified the phenomenon of “paper citi-
zens”: those who acquire citizenship in their country of residence sim-
ply by amassing identity documents through various, often extralegal, 
means.284 The existence of these paper citizens challenges conven-
tional understandings of the relationship between status and member-
ship.285 Indeed, in many countries, paper citizens participate fully in 
their new societies, for example, by voting and travelling abroad.286 
Like the “paperless” citizens discussed in this Article, these paper citi-
zens put pressure on our understanding of the citizenship line. 
 The existence of paper citizens challenges what Sadiq has termed 
the “distinguishability assumption,” the notion that there is a clear line 
between citizens and noncitizens.287 Sadiq notes that “the distinguisha-
bility assumption, the notion that a state can separate citizens from for-
eigners, is endemic to the literature on immigration and citizenship. It 
is the implicit basis for a literature detailing the differential, unequal 
treatment that illegal immigrants receive in contrast to citizens, for in-
stance.”288 He then argues that this literature is “conceptually blind, 
however, to the complex, poorly understood role of documents in 
bridging the divide between a citizen and a foreigner. The conceptual 
wall separating a citizen and an immigrant remains firm in this discus-
sion, anchored by taken-for-granted assumptions about the legal infra-
structure of citizenship.”289 He identifies the distinguishability assump-
tion as a product of the experiences of Western Europe and North 
America, where states exercise sovereign control through highly devel-
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oped bureaucracies that track individuals and monitor their status, and 
where unauthorized immigration is viewed as an anomaly, a problem to 
be solved, rather than as the norm.290 He argues that this model holds 
little relevance for the countries that he studies.291 
 Sadiq’s particular focus on undocumented migrants within Asia 
and on the political construction of citizenship leads him to emphasize 
regional differences and the importance of documents in constituting 
citizenship.292 His central insight about the distinguishability assump-
tion, however, carries broader significance and might inform our un-
derstanding of the evidentiary fragility of citizenship status in the Unit-
ed States. First, cases in which U.S. citizens have been deported suggest 
that the distinguishability assumption warrants scrutiny not just in 
countries with less highly developed immigration bureaucracies but in 
the United States as well. Second, the distinguishability assumption is 
relevant not just to the question of who obtains citizenship but also of 
who loses it. And finally, if one looks at citizenship not merely as a yes-
or-no question of legal doctrine but rather as a complex evidentiary 
question, and if one looks not only at the acquisition of citizenship but 
at the loss of it, it becomes clear that what is at issue is not just the pres-
ence or absence of documents, but also the procedures through which 
factual claims of citizenship are evaluated. In other words, the fact that 
Peter Guzman and Mark Lyttle had birth certificates on file made no 
difference in the determination of their status. They were not literally 
paperless, but nevertheless became functionally paperless. 
 None of this is to say that citizenship status is entirely constructed 
by such proceedings. We can still maintain some understanding of citi-
zenship status as existing apart from a particular (erroneous) adjudica-
tion of alienage. One can thus talk about a case like Peter Guzman’s as 
involving someone who is “really” a U.S. citizen but whose citizenship 
status has been ignored and thus effectively nullified. Yet we must also 
understand citizenship as something that can be functionally lost 
through such a process. For every case that comes to light, where some-
one like Peter Guzman manages to return to the United States, many 
others never surface.293 
                                                                                                                      
 
290 Sadiq, supra note 284, at 15. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 By definition, such cases cannot be documented, and thus cannot be counted. See 
Stevens, supra note 3, 618–29 (discussing existing data on deportations of U.S. citizens). In 
addition to those whose citizenship claims are never recognized, many may spend years 
deprived of their citizenship rights before eventually prevailing on a citizenship claim. See 
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 Citizenship, then, is not just a category that precedes immigration 
enforcement and determines the path that an enforcement action will 
follow. It is also a status that is produced by the administrative and judi-
cial procedures associated with immigration enforcement. Moreover, as 
Mario Guerrero’s description of his immigration and criminal proceed-
ings vividly conveys, citizenship status is not just produced by the en-
forcement process; it is produced differently by different enforcement 
processes. A person apprehended by immigration officers and charged 
with being a “removable alien” emerges from such a process catego-
rized as either a citizen or noncitizen. A person who is criminally 
charged in a federal district court with illegally entering or reentering 
the United States emerges from the resulting judicial proceeding 
deemed either a citizen or noncitizen. Crucially, the citizenship deter-
minations that emerge from such processes are often different due to 
differences in the procedures themselves, most notably the right to ap-
pointed counsel.294 The results of such proceedings are determined 
not only by the existence of documents and other forms of evidence—
i.e., by “paper” —but also by the nature of the procedures themselves. 
                                                                                                                     
C. Race and the (Alien) Citizenship Line 
 The citizenship line also provides a useful framework for consider-
ing the role of race in the construction of U.S. citizenship. The histori-
cal evolution of the citizenship line over the past century tells an im-
portant story about the shifting yet enduring role of race in shaping the 
boundaries of citizenship. 
 In the early decades of immigration restriction, when courts and 
agency officials openly admitted their inability to tell true citizenship 
claims apart from false ones, the nascent administrative state sought to 
solve the distinguishability problem primarily through race. Agency 
officials openly admitted this practice.295 In 1899, for example, the 
Treasury Secretary endorsed a recommendation regarding the adjudi-
cation of Chinese American citizenship claims that stated that “the 
Chinese are an undesirable addition to our society—that their presence 
is a disturbing element that tends only to evil and corruption, and that 
every presumption, every technicality and every intendment should be 
 
id. at 685–86 (discussing two erroneous deportations of U.S. citizens that each took ten 
years to resolve). 
294 See supra notes 244–255 and accompanying text. 
295 See Salyer, supra note 155, at 66–67. 
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held against their admission, and their testimony should have little or 
no weight standing alone.”296 
 Courts generally provided a more sympathetic forum for such 
claims,297 but exhibited biases of their own.298 In an 1891 case involving 
a sixteen-year-old boy who claimed to have been born in the United 
States, Supreme Court Justice David Brewer stood alone in finding fault 
with the agency’s treatment of Chinese American citizenship claims: 
“The government evidently rested on the assumption that because the 
witnesses were Chinese persons they were not to be believed. I do not 
agree with this.”299 In another dissent thirteen years later, he was still 
making the same point: 
Must an American citizen, seeking to return to this his native 
land, be compelled to bring with him two witnesses to prove 
the place of his birth or else be denied the right to return and 
all opportunity of establishing his citizenship in the courts of 
his country? No such rule is enforced against an American cit-
izen of Anglo-Saxon descent, and if this be, as claimed, a gov-
ernment of laws and not of men, I do not think it should be 
enforced against American citizens of Chinese descent.300 
 With the proliferation of documentation related to birth and citi-
zenship status over the course of the twentieth century, contested citi-
zenship claims occur today under very different circumstances than 
they did a century ago. Most international travelers now carry pass-
ports.301 Most births in the United States now take place in hospitals, 
and the vast majority of people born in the United States have regis-
tered births.302 There will probably never again be large numbers of 
                                                                                                                      
 
296 Id. at 67. 
297 See id. at 20 (noting that habeas courts in the early years of Chinese exclusion 
granted up to 85% of the petitions received). 
298 See In re Louie You, 97. F. 580, 581 (D. Or. 1899) (noting that the court was “not 
willing to establish the precedent of admitting Chinese persons,” where such a person had 
“admittedly remained out of the country for so great a length of time, unless some white 
witness, or some fact not depending on Chinese testimony, corroborates the testimony of 
the Chinese witnesses relied upon to establish the identity of the person who seeks a land-
ing”); see also In re Jew Wong Loy, 91 F. 240, 242 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (expressing doubts about 
the credibility of Chinese witnesses). 
299 Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 422–23 (1891) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
300 United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 178 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
301 Robertson, supra note 215, at 191. 
302 See Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statis-
tics, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Technical Appendix from Vital Statis-
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passengers arriving at international ports of entry claiming U.S. citizen-
ship without any papers to prove it. Nor will courts or agency officials 
openly cite race as a reason to deny such claims. 
 Yet race remains profoundly present in the adjudication of con-
temporary citizenship claims. The vast majority of recent cases that 
have come to light regarding deportations of citizens have involved in-
dividuals deported to Latin America and the Caribbean, and in particu-
lar to Mexico.303 To understand why, one must recognize that citizen-
                                                                                                                      
 
tics of the United States, 2002, Natality 12 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs.], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/techap02.pdf (stat-
ing that an estimated 99% of all live births in the United States were registered in 2002). 
303 No comprehensive records exist regarding U.S. citizens who have been deported or 
denied entry to the United States. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn, 
based on known cases, regarding the national origin (actual or imputed) of those citizens 
who have been subject to such actions. Of the thirty-five such cases with which I am famil-
iar, based on documentation gathered by myself and by Professor Jacqueline Stevens, thir-
ty-two cases (91%) involve individuals deemed to be from countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. List of Deported U.S. Citizens, Compiled by Jacqueline Stevens and Rachel 
E. Rosenbloom, Revised, (Nov. 4, 2013) (on file with author). Mexico alone accounts for 
twenty-six cases (74% of the total), with other countries in the region trailing far behind: 
Jamaica (two cases), Dominican Republic (two cases), and Colombia and Honduras (one 
case each). Id. Only three cases involve deportations to countries in other regions of the 
world: one to Italy, one to Armenia, and one to Laos. Id. Not included in these figures are 
the many cases that have come to light regarding individuals who have been detained for 
months or years while awaiting resolution of their citizenship claims. See, e.g., Flores-Torres 
v. Holder, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (habeas corpus petition of indi-
vidual detained for over three years who was ultimately found to be a U.S. citizen); Phil 
Fairbanks, Dominican Wins 10-Year Battle to Become U.S. Citizen, Buff. News, (May 16, 2013, 
1:23PM), http://www.buffalonews.com/20130515/dominican_wins_10_year_battle_to_ 
become_u_s_citizen.html (describing U.S. citizen detained for over six years). Rather, 
these figures include only U.S. citizens who were physically taken out of, or barred from 
entering, the United States—in some cases, multiple times—between the mid-1990s and 
the present, and who later prevailed on citizenship claims; the one exception is the Laos 
case, which involves a man who was subject to a final order of removal for over five years 
but was not physically removed due to the fact that the U.S. government faced difficulties 
repatriating deportees to Laos. See Bill Ong Hing, Detention to Deportation—Rethinking the 
Removal of Cambodian Refugees, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 891, 899 (2005) (explaining that 
“[t]he lack of diplomatic ties with countries like Vietnam and Laos prevents the return of 
nationals to those countries”). Professor Lee Terán has documented dozens of additional 
cases involving U.S. citizens removed to Mexico, many of whom were later prosecuted for 
reentry. See Terán, supra note 4, at 653–54 (referring to numerous such cases, including 
twelve handled by the Laredo office of the Federal Public Defender just in one year 
(2011), and sixteen handled by a single investigator at the El Paso Public Defender Office 
between 2009 and 2012). The inclusion of these cases in a statistical analysis would result 
in an even more pronounced emphasis on Mexican Americans. The prominence of Mexi-
can Americans within U.S. citizen deportation cases is consistent with the prominence of 
Mexicans within immigration enforcement actions generally. See John Simanski & Lesley 
M. Sapp, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2011, at 3 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
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ship determinations are shaped not only by the procedural norms that 
govern evidentiary determinations once an individual has entered the 
immigration enforcement system, but also by who enters the system in 
the first place. It is in this regard that the racial disparities of contem-
porary U.S. citizen deportations can best be understood. 
 As a matter of formal doctrine, factors such as race and the ability 
to speak unaccented English have no bearing on citizenship status. But 
they bear significantly on decisions of officers about whom to question 
and how to question them.304 Immigration officials have in particular 
scrutinized Mexican American citizenship claims as Mexicans have re-
placed the Chinese as the primary target of immigration enforcement 
over the course of the twentieth century.305 As Yuliana Castro recalled 
of her interrogation at the border, “After a while, I realized I had no 
way out since he told me no matter what I did, to him I was Mexi-
can.”306 Decades of circular migration, cross-border communities, and 
even immigration enforcement practices307 themselves have resulted in 
the existence of many U.S. citizens who do not “look” or “act” like U.S. 
citizens in the eyes of agency adjudicators. This is particularly evident 
with U.S. citizens who were born and raised in Mexico or born in the 
United States and brought to Mexico as young children.308 As in the 
                                                                                                                      
statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf (reporting that Mexican nationals accounted for 
76.3% of apprehensions in 2011). It should be noted, however, that it is far out of propor-
tion to the percentage of Mexican Americans within the U.S. citizen population: of the 
approximately 285 million U.S. citizens who reside in the United States, only 23.9 million 
(8.2%) are of Mexican birth or descent. See Thomas A. Gryn & Luke J. Larsen, U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, Nativity and Citizenship Status in the United States: 2009, at 2 (Oct. 
2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-16.pdf (reporting that as of 2009, 
there were 268,489,000 native-born citizens in the United States and 16,846,000 natural-
ized U.S. citizens); Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Mark Hugo Lopez, A Demographic Portrait of 
Mexican-Origin Hispanics in the United States, Pew Hispanic Center 5–6 (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/05/2013-04_Demographic-Portrait-of-Mexicans-
in-the-US.pdf (reporting that as of 2012, 33.7 million people of Mexican birth or descent 
live in the United States, of whom 71% are U.S. citizens). 
304 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 302, at 12; see also United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1975) (allowing immigration officials to 
consider “Mexican appearance” when making stops). 
305 Johnson, supra note 149, at 295. See generally Ngai, supra note 217 (discussing ra-
cialization of the “illegal alien” as Mexican). 
306 Ulloa, supra note 87 at 8; see supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text. 
307 Many of the acquired citizenship cases involve the children of U.S. citizens who 
were “repatriated” to Mexico as children during the 1930s. See Terán, supra note 4, at 599. 
308 See Terán, supra note 4, at 586–88. In a related phenomenon, the State Department 
has refused to recognize as valid many birth certificates from Southwestern border states 
submitted by Mexican Americans as proof of citizenship to support passport applications. 
See Rosenbloom, supra note 9, at 1. 
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case of the Castro sisters, Mexican Americans are often suspected of 
fraud even when they present facially valid documentation of citizen-
ship.309 
 In addition to the profiling that the Castro sisters faced at the bor-
der, racial profiling also plays a significant role in interior enforce-
ment.310 Nationally, immigration officers disproportionately interro-
gate and initiate removal proceedings against undocumented 
immigrants from Latin America as compared to undocumented immi-
grants from Asia or Europe.311 State and local police, who have taken 
on a greater role in immigration enforcement over the past decade, 
often racially profile immigrants.312 In addition, the increasing incor-
                                                                                                                      
 
309 For example, Luis Alberto Delgado, a nineteen-year-old U.S. citizen, was detained 
after a traffic stop despite producing a copy of his birth certificate, a Texas state identifica-
tion card, and a Social Security card. See Susan Carroll, Man Born at Ben Taub Returns After 
He’s Wrongly Deported, Hous. Chron., Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.chron.com/news/ 
houston-texas/article/Man-born-at-Ben-Taub-returns-after-he-s-wrongly-1694617.php; Kari 
Huus, Wrongfully Deported American Home After 3 Month Fight, NBC News, (Sept. 16, 2010, 
4:40PM) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39180275/ns/us_news-immigration_a_nation_ 
divided/t/wrongfully-deported-american-home-after-month-fight/#.UPCdnLRUOYs. In 
another incident, a border patrol officer tore up a birth certificate presented by a teenager 
who was born in Los Angeles and raised in Phoenix. Stevens, supra note 3, at 656 n.207. 
Jacqueline Stevens notes the following: 
I recorded seven cases of U.S. citizens denied entry at the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der despite presenting copies of U.S. birth certificates. All individuals had 
Hispanic surnames and were under eighteen years old the first time Border 
Patrol agents prevented them from returning to the United States. Each was 
turned away on two to fifteen occasions. 
Id. at 656 n.209. 
310 See Johnson, supra note 149, at 17; Johnson, supra note 3, at 678; Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 1, 17 (2009). 
311 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 702; Johnson, supra note 310, at 17. Data on worksite 
raids in New York in the late 1990s demonstrates that immigrants from Mexico and Cen-
tral and South America comprised more than 95% of those arrested in workplace raids, 
even though they represented just over 35% of the population of undocumented immi-
grants in New York in the period in question. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police En-
forcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1112 (2004). The disparity was 
particularly pronounced for Mexicans, who made up only 4% of the local undocumented 
population but 54% of those arrested in workplace raids. Id. at 1113. A review of a ran-
domly selected sample of investigation files revealed that INS agents targeted their raids at 
workplaces with large numbers of Hispanic workers. Id. They regularly considered factors 
such as “hearing ‘Spanish language’ or ‘Spanish music,’ or observing ‘Hispanic appear-
ance’ or clothing ‘not typical of North America.’” Id. 
312 For example, a study of arrest data from Irving, Texas found that after the Irving 
police department began participating in the Criminal Alien Program run by DHS, arrests 
of Latinos for petty crimes increased by 150%. See Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, 
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poration of immigration enforcement into the criminal justice system 
means that racial disparities within the criminal justice system have 
been imported into the realm of immigration.313 
                                                                                                                     
 Alien citizens—those who, despite formal citizenship status, are 
racially marked as foreign—are far more likely than others to end up in 
the immigration enforcement system in the first place. Once inside this 
system, they encounter structural barriers to prevailing on their citizen-
ship claims. These two dynamics, working in concert, result in a system 
in which alien citizenship results not only in the denial of full member-
ship but in the loss of citizenship status itself.314 In this way, race has 
continued to shape the boundaries of citizenship long after formal ra-
cial distinctions have been removed from the law. 
D. Beyond Exceptionalism 
 The citizenship line has implications not just for how we think 
about the nature of citizenship but also for how we respond on a prac-
tical level to the deportation of U.S. citizens. A common response to 
such cases is to call for enhanced safeguards to identify and assist po-
tential citizens. Such measures might include requiring Department of 
Homeland Security officers to screen individuals for possible citizen-
ship claims and to inform those who have a U.S. citizen parent of the 
laws regarding acquired citizenship;315 improving enforcement of exist-
ing policies that call for those with citizenship claims to be released 
from custody while their proceedings are pending; and providing ap-
pointed counsel for all those claiming citizenship.316 
 
The Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, The C.A.P. 
Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf. 
313 See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in 
the Age of Colorblindness 97–139 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing the racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system); David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the 
American Criminal Justice System (1999) (same). 
314 An erroneous determination of alienage does not preclude someone from later 
prevailing on a citizenship claim, and therefore should not be conflated with a formal 
revocation of citizenship. On a practical level, however, this distinction may be moot, as 
such a determination can functionally divest someone of citizenship status for a period of 
years or even permanently. 
315 See Terán, supra note 4, at 640, 642–43; see also Margaret D. Stock, Citizenship and 
Computers, Benders Immigr. Bull., Aug. 15, 2010, at 1, 1 (proposing improvements to 
record-keeping and data-sharing among DHS agencies regarding naturalization). 
316 See Terán, supra note 4, at 676–77. 
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 Such proposals, if implemented, would markedly improve on the 
current state of affairs. Furthermore, from an advocacy perspective 
there is a clear advantage to adopting such a strategy, as it would build 
on the special status that the Supreme Court has historically accorded 
to citizenship claims. Yet it is important to recognize the extent to 
which this response itself is embedded within the framework of the citi-
zenship line. These measures would, in effect, seek to shore up the citi-
zenship line, reinforcing the insulation between citizenship claims and 
the rest of the immigration enforcement system. 
 This strategy raises two concerns. First, on a normative level, a 
strategy that focuses specifically on U.S. citizens risks reinforcing the 
exceptionalism that has plagued immigration law since the nineteenth 
century. Cases involving citizens grab headlines and focus public atten-
tion on the shortcomings of the immigration enforcement system. 
Maintaining too narrow a focus on such cases, however, obscures the 
extent to which the same factors—summary proceedings, lack of coun-
sel, prolonged detention— foreclose valid claims for asylum and other 
forms of relief, leading to erroneous deportations that are arguably no 
less troubling than the deportation of U.S. citizens.317 U.S. citizen de-
portations reveal defects that impact the entire immigration enforce-
ment system, not simply the U.S. citizens within it. 
 On a more pragmatic level, the history of the citizenship line over 
the course of the twentieth century provides a cautionary tale about the 
effectiveness of such an approach. Since the 1920s, the repeated re-
sponse to the problem of U.S. citizens within immigration enforcement 
has been to try to erect barriers between citizenship claims and “ordi-
nary” immigration matters. Although these safeguards have provided 
the appearance of insulating citizens from the reduced due process 
protections accorded to noncitizens, they have not actually eliminated 
the deportation of citizens.318 They have perhaps even hindered at-
tempts to address the effects of immigration enforcement on U.S. citi-
zens by obscuring those effects. This is the root problem of the citizen-
ship line: procedural safeguards within an adjudicatory system cannot 
                                                                                                                      
317 See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and 
the Significance of Departure, 33 U. Haw. L. Rev. 139, 149–53 (2010) (describing the fre-
quency of wrongful deportations of noncitizens); see also Michele R. Pistone & John J. 
Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 
20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 167, 196 (2006) (estimating that between 1996 and 2005, approxi-
mately 20,000 bona fide asylum seekers were wrongly turned away from U.S. borders). 
318 See supra notes 236–255 (arguing that the legal protections put in place to protect 
citizens from deportation are not adequate). 
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be premised on a line that the system is itself engaged in drawing. Seek-
ing to separate out U.S. citizen cases is akin to granting the right to 
counsel in the criminal context only to those suspects who manage to 
maintain their innocence even after prolonged questioning without 
legal representation. 
 What would it mean, instead, to abandon the citizenship line? In 
other words, what would immigration enforcement look like, doctri-
nally, if we begin to let go of the framework of immigrants’ rights and 
instead view the system as one that directly impacts significant numbers 
of citizens as well as noncitizens every day? Such a change in perspec-
tive would shift the focus away from plenary power, with implications 
far beyond the relatively small proportion of cases that involve citizens. 
If one takes away the assumption that those in removal proceedings are 
noncitizens, it is difficult to see how a court could countenance pro-
longed detention without any individualized determination of danger-
ousness or flight risk,319 or fast-track removal procedures that bypass 
the immigration courts.320 
                                                                                                                     
 The right to appointed counsel presents a more complex question. 
Given the designation of removal proceedings as civil rather than crim-
inal,321 recognizing the presence of citizens among the detained popu-
lation would not in itself necessitate any dramatic shift in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. The Court’s recognition of a right to counsel in 
areas such as juvenile detention and civil commitment,322 however, pro-
vide compelling analogies to the situation of someone facing immigra-
tion detention and possible removal from the United States.323 The 
U.S. citizen deportation cases that have come to light provide powerful 
examples of the difference that access to counsel makes, due to the 
growing number of cases in which those who have been misclassified as 
noncitizens within removal proceedings later prevail on citizenship 
claims when prosecuted for illegal reentry.324 
 Abandoning the procedural aspects of immigration exceptional-
ism would not in itself create an error-free adjudication system; the 
criminal courts provide ample evidence that coercive conditions and 
 
319 See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra notes 154, 225–235 and accompanying text. 
321 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (discussing effects of desig-
nation of immigration as civil rather than criminal). 
322 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
323 See supra note 144. There have been growing calls for developing systems for ap-
pointed counsel, most prominently by Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit. See 
Dolnick, supra note 144. 
324 See supra notes 244–255 and accompanying text. 
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adjudicatory errors can occur even with heightened constitutional pro-
tections.325 Furthermore, even such a radical shift in perspective would 
not address the substantive aspects of immigration exceptionalism, in-
cluding the Court's longstanding refusal to consider factors such as 
proportionality or family unity within the context of deportation.326 
Nevertheless, abandoning the citizenship line and bringing immigra-
tion enforcement into the mainstream with regard to procedural pro-
tections would significantly transform a system that is currently de-
signed to encourage individuals to abandon legal claims—citizenship-
related and otherwise—rather than to pursue them. 
Conclusion 
 Approaching the detention and deportation system through the 
lens of citizenship reveals a deep contradiction within the foundation 
of immigration exceptionalism. Despite repeated attempts to shore up 
the citizenship line since the 1920s, the distinction between citizen and 
noncitizen has not proven strong enough to bear the weight that courts 
have placed on it. Incidents in which U.S. citizens are detained or de-
ported are often characterized as rare and tragic errors. Yet the misclas-
sification of citizens as noncitizens occurs routinely, not just due to a 
failure to follow protocol but often due to the protocol itself. This in-
sight has the potential to contribute both to scholarly discussions of 
citizenship and to advocacy strategies to reform the immigration en-
forcement system. Although a common and understandable reaction to 
the erroneous deportation of U.S. citizens is to seek to strengthen the 
safeguards that separate citizens from noncitizens, a wiser course would 
be to do just the opposite, by implementing increased procedural pro-
tections throughout the immigration enforcement system without re-
gard to claimed citizenship status. An enduring solution can come only 
from abandoning the conceit that an adjudication system can simulta-
                                                                                                                      
325 For a concise account of the innocence movement and associated scholarship, see 
generally Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1549. See also Alexander, 
supra note 313, at 84–89 (describing the structural barriers that steer indigent defendants 
toward accepting guilty pleas rather than going to trial). 
326 For critiques of the substantive aspects of immigration exceptionalism, see, e.g., 
Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold, supra note 129, at 3 (referring to the plenary power doc-
trine as a relic of racism from the Plessy v. Ferguson era); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary 
Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1115, 
1168 (2002) (calling plenary power a violation of international law); Schuck, supra note 
129, at 3 (referring to the plenary power doctrine as being out of step with contemporary 
public law norms); see also Motomura, Curious Evolution, supra note 129, at 1699–1704 (ex-
ploring the interplay between procedural and substantive claims). 
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neously employ two separate sets of procedural norms, based upon a 
citizenship line that the system itself is engaged in drawing. 
